Human Error in Commercial Fishing Vessel Accidents: An Investigation Using the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System by Zohorsky, Peter J.
Old Dominion University 
ODU Digital Commons 
Engineering Management & Systems 
Engineering Theses & Dissertations 
Engineering Management & Systems 
Engineering 
Summer 8-2020 
Human Error in Commercial Fishing Vessel Accidents: An 
Investigation Using the Human Factors Analysis and 
Classification System 
Peter J. Zohorsky 
Old Dominion University, pzohorsky@gmail.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/emse_etds 
 Part of the Human Factors Psychology Commons, Operational Research Commons, and the Systems 
Engineering Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Zohorsky, Peter J.. "Human Error in Commercial Fishing Vessel Accidents: An Investigation Using the 
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System" (2020). Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), Dissertation, 
Engineering Management & Systems Engineering, Old Dominion University, DOI: 10.25777/sb7t-mr44 
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/emse_etds/178 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Engineering Management & Systems 
Engineering at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Engineering Management & Systems 
Engineering Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, 
please contact digitalcommons@odu.edu. 
 
 
HUMAN ERROR IN COMMERCIAL FISHING VESSEL ACCIDENTS: 
 AN INVESTIGATION USING THE HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS AND 
CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM 
by 
Peter J. Zohorsky 
B.S. May 1983, United States Coast Guard Academy 
M.S. September 1993, Naval Postgraduate School 
 
 
A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of 
Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment of the  
Requirements for the Degree of 
 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT AND SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 




 Approved by: 
  
 Holly Handley (Director) 
 
            Cesar Pinto (Member) 
 
            Charles Daniels (Member) 
 





HUMAN ERROR IN COMMERCIAL FISHING VESSEL ACCIDENTS: 
AN INVESTIGATION USING THE HUMAN FACTORS ANALYSIS AND 
CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM 
 
Peter J. Zohorsky 
Old Dominion University, 2020 




The commercial fishing industry is frequently described as one of the most hazardous 
occupations in the United States.  The objective, to maximize the catch, is routinely challenged 
by a variety of elements due to the environment, the vessel, the crew, and several external 
considerations and how they interact with each other.  The analysis of fishing vessel accidents 
can be complicated due to the diverse nature of the industry, including the species caught, the 
type and size of boat that is employed, how far travelled from their homeport, and the adequacy 
of the support organizations ensuring safe and uninterrupted operations.  This study will develop 
and evaluate a version of Wiegmann and Shappell’s (2003) Human Factors Analysis and 
Classification System (HFACS), specifically for commercial fishing industry vessels (HFACS-
FV), using ten years of data documenting the causes of fatal accidents in the commercial fishing 
industry.  For this study, the accident investigation information will be converted into the 
HFACS-FV format by independent raters and measured for inter-rater reliability.  The results 
will be analyzed for the frequency of the causal factors identified by the raters, and causal factors 
will also be evaluated for their relationship with vessel demographic information.  Based on the 
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1.1 Problem statement 
The hazards and tragic results associated with a commercial fishing vessel accident while 
operating in severe weather conditions are discussed by Junger (1997).  Junger detailed the 
challenges of a fishing voyage in the North Atlantic Ocean.  He described the importance of both 
teamwork and sustained physically demanding work in an environment of rotating deck 
equipment and moving fishing gear while working with dangerous tools on wet and slippery 
decks in a variety of weather and sea conditions.  Commercial fishing is consistently ranked as 
one of the most hazardous occupations in the United States (Drudi, 1998; U.S Coast Guard, 
1999).  According to data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, workers in the commercial fishing 
industry had the second-highest occupational death rate for the year 2018, as shown in Table 1 
(U.S. Department of Labor, 2019).  Commercial fishing is a unique maritime industry where the 
vessels transit to their fishing grounds and back to port to offload their catch rather than carrying 
passengers or cargo from one port to another.  Safety within the commercial fishing industry is 
dependent upon the boats, their operators, and several external factors, all interacting 
dynamically and simultaneously (National Research Council, 1991).  
Transportation and industrial accidents that cause physical injury, economic impact, or 
environmental damage are common occurrences, as shown in Table 2 (U.S. Department of 
Labor, 2017; U.S. Department of Transportation, 2017; Kuhlman, 1977).  Investigations of 
accidents to determine their cause are conducted for various reasons including: the owner's 




Table 1. Highest fatal work injury rates for civilian occupations for 2018, per 100,000 full-time 
equivalent workers (U.S. Department of Labor, 2019). 
Occupation Fatal work injury rate 
Logging workers 97.6 
Fishers and related fishing workers 77.4 
Aircraft pilots and flight engineers 58.9 
Roofers 51.5 
Refuse and recyclable material collectors 44.3 
Driver/sales workers and truck drivers 26.0 
Farmers, ranchers, and agricultural managers 24.7 
Structural iron and steelworkers 23.6 
Supervisors of construction/extraction workers 21.0 




potential liability, to examine the impact to work processes, the interest of labor organizations 
about workplace safety, concerns of the public, and governmental assessment of regulatory 
standards.  Investigations examine all aspects of the accident to understand the mechanisms and 
circumstances present, as well as the interaction of the persons, machinery, and working 
conditions that contributed to the accident (Kuhlman, 1977).  An analysis of the accident should 
consider ways or actions necessary to preclude a similar accident in the future.  Dekker (2006) 
stated that “the ultimate goal of an investigation is to learn from failure” (p. 5).     
 
Table 2. Transportation-related fatalities in the U.S. for 2000, 2010, 2015 (U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 2017). 
Mode 2000 2010 2015 
Air 764 477 404 
Highway 41,945 32,999 35,485 
Railroad 937 735 751 
Transit Rail 197 120 151 
Water 701 821 700 
Pipeline 38 19 10 




Luo and Shin (2019) separated maritime accident causes into six groups: vessel and 
equipment, environment, traffic, navigation and operation, market factors, and human factors.  
Human factors is the broad multi-disciplinary area of study focused on the optimization of 
interactions of humans and machines in a system (Proctor and Van Zandt, 2008).  Human factors 
are widely considered to contribute to most shipping accidents (Talley, 2000; Sulaiman et al., 
2011).  The contribution of human factors to accidents was explored by Reason (1990, 1997), 
who was studying accidents in the nuclear power industry.  His resulting "Swiss cheese model" 
compared accidents as the failed layers of defenses to the holes lining up in slices of Swiss 
cheese.  The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) model, initially 
developed by Wiegmann and Shappell (2001) to categorize the various causes of military 
aviation accidents, has its roots in the human error studies completed by Reason (1990, 1997). 
Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) estimated that human factors contribute to 70 - 80 percent of 
aviation accidents.  Studies using HFACS have examined accident data across the transportation, 
industrial, and healthcare sectors (Shappell et al., 2007; Baysari et al., 2009; Lenne et al., 2012; 
Cohen et al., 2018). 
1.2 Research objective 
This study will adapt the framework provided by HFACS for the commercial fishing 
industry to investigate the role of human factors in fatal commercial fishing accidents.  It will 
establish HFACS as an appropriate model to classify the causal factors that contribute to these 
accidents.  The resulting data will then be analyzed for patterns or trends that determine the 
human factors causes in maritime accidents and to evaluate if mitigations can be proposed to 




1.3 Research questions 
The investigation into the contribution of human factors in commercial fishing accidents 
will use a modified HFACS framework.  The accident data organized in this way allows for the 
overall analysis and categorization of the causal factors of these commercial fishing accidents.  
To support this study, several research questions will be investigated: 
Question 1:  Is HFACS an appropriate tool for analyzing accidents caused by human 
factors in the commercial fishing industry? 
Question 2:  Does the use of the HFACS-FV framework identify any pattern or consistent 
distribution of the various human error categories that contribute to commercial fishing vessel 
accidents in the United States? 
Question 3:  Does the data suggest that organizational factors have less impact on 
commercial fishing vessel accidents in the United States than supervisory or non-supervisory 
issues? 
Question 4:  Does the data suggest that latent conditions have less impact on commercial 
fishing vessel accidents in the United States than active conditions? 
Question 5:  Is there any relationship to reliability estimates for identified human factors 
and the quality of the information provided in the investigation? 
1.4 Research background 
Like many complex socio-technical systems, commercial fishing vessel operations 
represent a wide variety of individuals and groups that work within their organizational 
structures with their own goals, constraints, and procedures.  Interactions within this socio-
technical system, whether on the boats, the businesses who buy their product, the companies who 
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support them, or those who regulate them, is a dynamic of their daily operation with numerous 
outside factors to consider like weather or sea conditions (National Research Council, 1991).  
Commercial fishing vessels operate in extreme diversity.  Their targeted catch is the driver for 
the waters they will fish and the gear they need, their hull construction, and their crew 
requirements.  While many of the vessels are owned corporately, a substantial number are 
individually owned and operated (National Research Council, 1991).  Because of this 
complexity, an accident analysis tool for this domain must have the ability to identify a variety of 
causal factors; the numerous HFACS subdivisions demonstrate the complexity of categorizing 
accident causes (Wiegmann and Shappell, 2003).  The diversified factors selected in this process 
that contribute to these accidents represent the first step toward the goal of improving safety and 
minimizing accidents. This HFACS evaluation of commercial fishing vessel accidents will 
provide useful insights into the various entities and conditions, directly or indirectly, involved in 
this industry to protect human lives, property and the environment in the future. 
1.5 Research challenges 
This study depends on the accuracy of the causal factors in the data that will be directly 
exported for the application of HFACS.  The data utilized for this study originated from marine 
accident reports and their subsequent investigations.  While human error is recognized as a cause 
of all accidents, including commercial fishing vessel accidents, the way all investigators collect 
and code the data may not be directly applicable to the HFACS framework.  While detailed 
investigations are expected to reveal causal factors accurately, depending on the training, 
experience, and workload of the assigned investigator, the investigation may not account for 
human error properly.  Dekker (2006) described the terms “old view” and “new view” as related 
to human error.  The old view is that accidents are due to mistakes made by the operator.  The 
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new view is that systems contain inherent vulnerabilities and weak spots with operators who are 
trying to do a good job.  Investigators are assumed to be unbiased and to consider not only 
mistakes made by the operator but the defects within the system that may have had an impact on 
the operator.  The concern about the inconsistent quality of the information provided in 
commercial fishing vessel accident investigations was previously identified by Lincoln (2006). 
Evaluation and assignment of causal factors using the HFACS categories require 
familiarization and experience (Wiegmann and Shappell, 2003).  From the HFACS perspective, 
an investigation is necessary before HFACS can be applied and evaluated.  The investigation 
needs to be thorough and impartial.  The results of the investigation are essential to prevent 
similar events but are also critical for an accurate HFACS utilization.  
Any data set being evaluated for statistical purposes depends on the completeness of the 
data to provide meaningful analysis.  While accidents that require notifications may be subject to 
under-reporting for several reasons, including responsibility for damages and employment 
consequences, it is reasonable to believe that accidents involving fatalities and the necessary 
documentation for the various public, private, and family interests would minimize this issue. 
This study considers that all HFACS causative factors may not apply to all commercial 
fishing vessels and the accidents represented in the data.  Companies that own or operate 
commercial fishing vessels vary considerably in their size and scope.  A company may consist of 
one boat owned and operated by one person or may be part of a regional, national, or 
international company.  Regardless of the size of the company, it is valuable and significant to 
study the impact of human error on accidents affecting commercial fishing vessels in this 
dangerous and minimally regulated industry using HFACS.  “Self-employed” fishing industry 
personnel, which account for nearly half of all industry fatalities on vessels, may not be as likely 
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to have the full representation of data in the fields for management and supervision (U.S Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, 2012).  This is different from previous maritime HFACS studies that have 
considered oceangoing ships with a fully developed management and support structure onshore.  
It could also be a reason that HFACS has not been previously applied to commercial fishing 
vessels. 
1.6 Research contributions 
The direct contribution of this study to the body of knowledge will be to adapt the 
HFACS for commercial fishing vessel accidents and evaluate accident data with this version.  
This technique will identify the various causative human factors that contributed to commercial 
fishing vessel accidents using the modified HFACS.  The indirect contribution will be providing 
a methodology for the HFACS modification for application to other types of vessels, as well as 
other transportation or industrial sectors.  In addition, the identification of the human factors that 
contribute to these fatal accidents is critical to vessel owners, operators, and regulators to 
evaluate the current practices and initiate safer procedures in an effort to minimize injury and 






BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
  Several topics will be explored in this section to provide the theoretical basis for this 
study.  A discussion of the development of modern human factors and human error will be 
followed by descriptions of human reliability analysis, human error identification, and accident 
analysis, including representative methods of these topics.  This will lead to an explanation of the 
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), including a review of the 
literature applying the method in a variety of applications.  Concluding this chapter, the common 
hazards and safety concerns within the commercial fishing industry will be examined.  
2.1 Historical foundation of human error study 
Human error as a causative factor in industrial accidents began after Watt’s steam engine 
and Whitney’s cotton gin inventions saw their early application within the textile industry in the 
late eighteenth century.  Heinrich (1931) detailed how industrial safety improvements occurred 
at a much slower rate than industrial development and expansion.  He described dangerous 
working conditions, including overcrowded factories with poor lighting and ventilation.  
Employees, including children, worked more than twelve hours each day, and injuries and 
fatalities were commonplace.  Advances in safety were slow to develop and slower to be 
implemented.  In 1833, factory inspections were initiated in England (Heinrich, 1931).  Even as 
the pace of innovation within the industrial and transportation sectors increased, safety hazards 
and their impact on people were accepted in the quest for progress.   
As the nineteenth century concluded and the twentieth century began, safety 
advancements were made due to a variety of employers’ liability and workers’ compensation 
laws, the advent of numerous safety organizations, a prospering insurance market, the publishing 
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of industry-specific periodicals, and governmental agencies examining the causes and 
preventative measures of accidents (Heinrich, 1931).  These ventures still could not surpass the 
rapid growth and diversification in the manufacturing, mining, railroad, and maritime industries.  
As populations increased in urban centers around the world, concepts like more, better, bigger, 
and faster were instrumental in enhancing the divide between technology and safety.  Heinrich 
(1931) also produced research regarding the causes of industrial accidents.  He analyzed 75,000 
industrial accidents and concluded that unsafe acts primarily caused 88%, unsafe physical or 
mechanical conditions caused 10%, and 2% of the accidents were unpreventable.  Figure 1 
represents his findings.  Heinrich (1931) also proposed a model that compared ratios of accidents 
causing injuries.  Based on data from 5,000 accidents, Heinrich developed the theory of the 300-
29-1 ratio.  These numbers represented the seriousness of injuries from 330 accidents where 300 
would result in no injury, 29 would result in minor injury, and one would result in a major injury, 
as shown in Figure 2.  This model showed the importance of evaluating and learning from "near 
misses" that result in no injury or minor injury.  Identifying and resolving unsafe conditions 
provides an opportunity to prevent a more severe accident that may impact life, property, or the 
environment.  These two representations of accidents and their causes have remained valuable to 
the examination of human error and the progression of safety improvements within the industrial 
and transportation sectors. Significant opportunities to study human error became available with 
global military conflicts and the maturation of aviation in the first part of the twentieth century.  
An important work in human error and ergonomics was completed shortly after World War II by 
surveying hundreds of military pilots.  Fitts and Jones (1947) studied the perception and 















Figure 1: Heinrich’s model of industrial accident causation. Adapted from Heinrich (1931). 
 
including incorrectly reading multi-revolution instruments and improperly applying instrument 
scales, provided a direct connection between cognitive functioning, equipment design, and 
operational error.  Their foundational research provided insight into daily hazards encountered 
by aviators that had previously not been collected and analyzed. 
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worker and work conditions 
UNSAFE ACTS OF WORKERS 
1. Unsafe preparation for task 
2. Unsafe speed of equipment 
3. Inoperative safety devices 
4. Unsafe equipment operation 
5. Unsafe operations during processing 
6. Unsafe worker positions 
7. Unsafe operations on moving or 
dangerous equipment 
8. Unsafe distractions 
9. Unsafe use of protective devices 
UNSAFE CONDITIONS 
1. Unsafe guards 
2. Lack of guards 
3. Unsafe surfaces 
4. Unsafe machines and tools 
5. Unsafe arrangements 
6. Unsafe lighting 
7. Unsafe ventilation 
8. Unsafe clothing 






(88% unsafe worker acts, 
















Figure 2: Heinrich’s 300-29-1 ratio foundation of a major injury. Adapted from Heinrich, (1931). 
 
2.2 Safety and human reliability 
The modern study of human error was sparked by accelerated technological innovation 
and a series of unfortunate accidents in the 1970s and 1980s across the transportation and 
industrial sectors.  Accidents including the crash of an Eastern Air Lines flight in Florida in 
1972, the runway collision of Pan Am and KLM jets in the Canary Islands in 1977, the Three 
Mile Island partial meltdown in 1979, the Hyatt Regency skyway collapse in Kansas City, 
Missouri in 1981, the Ocean Ranger sinking in the Atlantic Ocean in 1982, the methyl 
isocyanate release in Bhopal, India in 1984, the Challenger explosion in 1986, the Chernobyl 
explosions in 1986, the Herald of Free Enterprise capsizing in 1987, and the Piper Alpha fire in 
the North Sea in 1988 demonstrated the impact of human error across various applications and 
are summarized in Table 3 (Reason, 1990; Chiles, 2002).  
These tragic accidents highlight the complexity of modern technology in these diverse 
industries.  Transportation and industrial workers are often most at risk from these accidents.  
The impacts of unsafe work environments are far-reaching.  Though generally described as lost 
  
 
One major injury 
29 minor injuries 
300 accidents with no injury 
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Table 3: Significant accidents of the 1970s and 1980's and their impact (Kemeny, 1979; Zeller, 
1981; Sheen, 1987; Reason, 1990; Chiles, 2002). 
Event Impact 
Eastern Airlines crash in Florida (1972) 101 deaths 
Canary Islands runway collision (1977) 583 deaths 
Three Mile Island partial meltdown (1979) voluntary evacuation of 140,000 residents 
Hyatt Regency skyway collapse (1981) 114 deaths 
Ocean Ranger sinking (1982) 84 deaths 
Bhopal gas release (1984) estimated 7,000 deaths 
Challenger explosion (1986) 7 deaths 
Chernobyl explosions (1986) estimated 5,000 – 10,000 deaths; government evacuated 135,000 residents 
Herald of Free Enterprise capsizing (1987) 193 deaths 




time and lost revenue, Petersen (1971) included specific effects of lost time from the employee 
injuries, retraining and supervisory losses, repair of damaged equipment, and lost income to the 
employee's family, delays to operations, and employee retention.  These unsafe environments are 
prone to accidents.  Johnson (1973) provided a comprehensive definition of the word accident in 
this manner: 
1. An accident is an unwanted transfer of energy,  
2. Because of lack of barriers and/or controls, 
3. Producing injury to persons, property or process, 
4.  Proceeded by sequences of planning and operational errors which: 
a. Failed to adjust to changes in physical or human factors, 
b.  And produced unsafe conditions and/or unsafe acts, 
5.  Arising out of the risk in an activity, 
6.  And interrupting or degrading the activity (p. 25). 
Accidents and unsafe operations are symptoms of a system with low reliability, according to 
Kelly and Boring (2009).  Human reliability refers to how likely a person or persons can 
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adequately complete an assignment within a specified time criterion (Meister, 1966; Swain and 
Guttmann, 1983).  However, Leveson (2004) pointed out that this relationship between safety 
and reliability was not without exception and that systems existed that were unsafe with high 
reliability and safe with low reliability.    
Singleton (1972) highlighted the concern associated with evaluating human error.  Due to 
the wide variety of factors connected with errors involved and the objectives of the analysis, the 
sorting and classifying of errors is a primary issue to resolve.  Singleton (1972) described human 
error classifications, including errors of commission and omission, reversible and irreversible, 
systematic and random, and formal and substantive. Throughout the review of relevant literature, 
there are varying taxonomies referred to as human reliability analysis (HRA) techniques, human 
error identification (HEI) techniques, or accident analysis techniques.  While all are important 
for the reduction of accidents, and specific methods may be more appropriate for applications 
within a particular industry or transportation sector, it is challenging to infer consensus regarding 
the categorization of these techniques without an understanding of the author's perspective.  The 
various methods can prove troublesome during comparisons when attempting to evaluate 
appropriate methods to analyze the specific data. 
Calvo Olivares et al. (2018) described a human error classification scheme with four 
significant divisions, including taxonomies based on the task, taxonomies of information 
processing, taxonomies and models of symbolic processing, and HRA techniques of 
quantification.  Taxonomies based on the task categorize various human error modes or system 
errors.  Taxonomies of information processing utilize input and output actions in the evaluation 
of human performance.  Taxonomies and models of symbolic processing are a diverse grouping 
that use physical and cognitive theories to represent a systematic analysis of error.  HRA 
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techniques for quantification are comprised of first generation, second generation, third 
generation, and expert judgment methods.  
2.3 Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) methods 
Kirwan (1997) characterized HRAs as methods to evaluate risks within a system to avoid 
accidents.  HRA methods can be retrospective or prospective, according to Cacciabue (2010).  
Retrospective HRA occurs after the accident or incident and uses information from the actual 
event to uncover the cause of the event.  Prospective HRA involves the modeling of human-
machine interactions to predict and evaluate the possible impacts of the system.   
Kelly and Boring (2009) delineate three steps in HRA as error identification, modeling, 
and quantification.  The error identification phase includes deconstructing the system into tasks 
and sub-tasks and establishing actual or likely sources of error.  The next stage is modeling, 
which assesses overall risk through the use of event trees, fault trees, or other methods to 
evaluate the sequence of human actions in the system.  The final phase is quantification, where 
human error probabilities are determined.  
First generation HRA methods are characterized by Cacciabue (2004) as concentrating on 
the quantitative probability of success or failure of the operation or performance.  However, 
evaluation related to the factors directly associated with system failures or errors is lacking, and 
ultimately first generation HRA methods may prove ineffective in preventing subsequent 
accidents.  Examples of first generation HRA are described in the following paragraphs. 
The Accident Initiation and Progression Analysis (AIPA) originated in the nuclear energy 
industry during the 1970s (Kirwan, 1992a).  This probabilistic method was intended to determine 
if the operator’s responses during plant operation were effective or not.  It was expected to 
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encourage rapid and accurate responses by the operator but provided no insight regarding how 
decisions were made or what factors contributed to incorrect decisions (Hollnagel, 1996).  Bell 
and Holroyd (2009) noted that this method was no longer in use. 
The Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) was developed during the 
1960s and 1970s and is based on event tree analysis.  It is meant to identify system boundaries 
and failures, human error events and probabilities, evaluate system failures, and provide 
recommendations for change to prevent a similar failure in the future.  A fundamental concept 
within THERP determining if the error was caused by an act of omission or an act of 
commission.  This "action" element is similar to AIPA, which attempted to link the recognition 
of a system abnormality with a suitable response.  THERP provides an expanded analysis of the 
probabilities associated with the system, its operation, and its weaknesses (Swain and Guttmann, 
1983). 
The Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) was developed by 
Williams (1985) and has been influential in the creation of other HRAs.  The method is based on 
the relationship between reliability and the task being considered.  It is known for its relatively 
easy application, including a task analysis using generic task types and error producing 
conditions to calculate human error probabilities.  HEART has been applied in various industries 
and requires minimal outside resources to arrive at a nominal likelihood of failure (Bell and 
Holroyd, 2009). 
The Operator Action Tree System (OATS) was formulated by Wreathall (1982).  This 
technique consists of the following segments: generation of event trees covering plant safety 
functions, necessary actions for plant safety, applicable alarms and expected response time, and 
production of event trees or fault trees for the human reliability analysis of the revealed errors 
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and approximate error probabilities.  Similar to AIPA, operator actions will be termed as success 
or failure (Hollnagel, 1996). 
The Human Cognitive Reliability (HCR) model was created in the 1980s (Hannaman and 
Worledge, 1988) and is grounded in the skill-based, rule-based, and knowledge-based framework 
(Rasmussen, 1983).  The critical portions of this model include: establish which actions will be 
evaluated, categorize the necessary cognitive processing mechanisms, decide median time for 
operator’s response, modify the median time for relevant performance factors, estimate the 
system time window for each action to be performed, and calculate the normalized time value by 
dividing the system time window by the median response time.  The HCR model utilizes no 
response in addition to actions classified as success or failure (Bell and Holroyd, 2009). 
Drawbacks of first generation HRA methods were incorporated into the changes that 
resulted in second generation HRA methods when they were introduced in the 1990s as 
described by Bowo et al. (2017).  These methods examine the system background, cognitive, and 
human behaviors that led to the error (Bell and Holroyd, 2009; Calvo Olivares et al., 2018).  
Summaries of selected second generation HRA methods are provided below. 
The Cognitive Environment Simulator (CES) utilized artificial intelligence and computer 
simulation to model operator response and was initially developed for the nuclear power 
industry.  CES provides a virtual operational plant control panel for the operator and produces 
accurate scenarios that an operator is likely to encounter.  CES is a valuable tool to catalog 
operator responses to resolve critical system troubles but has seen limited application since the 
1980s (Bell and Holroyd, 2009). 
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The Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis Method (CREAM) is a qualitative method, 
suitable for prospective or retrospective analysis that utilizes cognitive processes to evaluate 
operator response reactions.  CREAM starts with a task analysis and then generates categorized 
tables of errors and actions.  Error modes, organizational, and general system operations are 
evaluated as part of the analysis.  The system is examined using these nine common performance 
conditions: organizational adequacy, working environment, suitability of human-machine 
interface and support of operations, procedure availability, number of simultaneous objectives, 
necessary time for operations, time the operation occurs, training and proficiency assessment, 
and the degree of crew cooperation (Hollnagel, 1998). 
A Technique for Human Error Analysis (ATHEANA) was produced for the nuclear 
power industry as a qualitative and quantitative technique that can be used for retrospective and 
prospective HRA evaluations.  It was developed using a team of industry and reliability experts 
for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1996).  ATHEANA is a method consisting of ten 
elements but essentially is comprised of a task analysis, error identification, linking relevant 
failures to error producing conditions, and calculating error probability of these events.  Bell and 
Holroyd (2009) describe the highly detailed process as productive but also complicated and 
inefficient. 
Third generation HRA methods are a minor division and represent a blending of first and 
second generation methods (Flaus, 2013; Hogenboom, 2018).  The Nuclear Action Reliability 
Assessment (NARA) was developed by Kirwan et al. (2005) and is based on HEART to estimate 
human error in the nuclear power industry.  NARA utilizes generic type and error producing 




Expert judgment methods are unique approaches that utilize the demonstrated mastery 
and opinions of those recognized for their specific knowledge to analyze and estimate error 
probabilities of a system (Bell and Holroyd, 2009; Calvo Olivares et al., 2018).  The Success 
Likelihood Index Method using the Multi-Attribute Utility Decomposition (SLIM-MAUD) 
technique is an expert judgment, the computer-aided analysis described by Embry et al. (1984) 
and initially developed for the nuclear power industry.  A group of experts is utilized to assess 
the priority and weighting of performance shaping factors and their effect on system reliability.  
The sum of weighted performance shaping factors becomes the success likelihood index, which 
is then converted into human error probability estimates.  SLIM-MAUD is versatile but subject 
to the biases and time demands of the team of experts (Bell and Holroyd, 2009).  
2.4 Human error theory development 
Accidents in the industrial, transportation, and medical sectors are attributed mainly to 
human error (Kirwan, 1987; Pennie et al., 2007; Uğurlu et al., 2013; Cohen, 2017; Ung, 2018).  
Reason (1997) defines human error as “the failure of planned actions to achieve their desired 
ends” (p. 71).   Human error is common in all human endeavors, and it is most troubling when 
those persons taking action believe that their years of experience make them exempt from 
accidents (Allnut, 2002).  Kirwan (1992b) provided the essential criteria by which human error 
identification (HEI) methods should be assessed; these include thoroughness, ability to produce 
correct results, and practical applicability to the data or event being evaluated.  HEI methods are 
beneficial in that they identify the external error type as well as the mechanism behind the error.  
Performance shaping factors, those categories of various human errors that may be present in the 
event, are common to most HEI methods.  
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The Systematic Human Error Reduction and Prediction Approach (SHERPA) method 
evaluates the various tasks within a system, and qualitatively assesses their priority to the risk 
posed to the system (Flaus, 2013).  The technique involves a task-by-task analysis and 
classification, error identification, evaluation of consequences and error recovery, error 
probability frequency, error consequence, and possible error reduction mechanisms (Embry, 
1986).  The resulting analysis, according to Flaus (2013), is comprehensive but demanding with 
no regard for cognitive errors. 
The System Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) was developed by 
Leveson (2004).  This system-based method proposed that accidents are the result of interacting 
organizational, environmental, and technical elements of the system.  Accidents occur when 
system limitations are not recognized, are improperly implemented, or are exceeded (Grant et al., 
2018).  STAMP uses system development and operations models to determine and constrain the 
interaction between system elements. 
Rasmussen (1983) proposed the Skill-Rule-Knowledge (SRK) classification method to 
categorize human behavior and ultimately explain human error.  Skill-based behavior refers to 
automatic actions and responses.  This learned behavior becomes intuitive with minimal mental 
exertion.  Rule-based behavior is based on procedures and specifically whether a procedure is 
being followed or not.  Knowledge-based behavior involves cognitive effort. Making decisions 
and solving problems are common applications of knowledge-based behavior.  Skill-based errors 




Causal modeling represents a number of techniques to sequentially diagram a process or 
system by examining how an accident occurred.  Two standard methods in error analysis are 
fault tree and event tree analysis.  Fault tree analysis can be employed qualitatively or 
quantitatively to break down an accident or event into progressively detailed causes.  The 
presentation of a fault tree analysis shows the event at the top of the diagram with subsequent 
layers of causes beneath that and uses logic gates, including "AND" and "OR" to finally arrive at 
the root cause or causes (Lewis, 1996; Flaus, 2013).  Event trees, often referred to as 
consequence trees, provide a quantitative probability estimate of the effects of the unwanted 
event.  In this method, the tree is diagrammed in a left to right orientation, with the event being 
continuously subdivided, showing further impacts of the event in a binary decision manner 
leading to the consequences of each of the tree branches (Lewis, 1994; Flaus, 2013). 
The Human Error Identification in System Tools (HEIST) developed by Kirwan (1994) 
uses pre-identified performance shaping factors that represent the various errors likely to be 
encountered in a system.  Then each performance shaping factor is evaluated in a table with four 
categories: error identification question, external error mode, system cause/psychological error 
mechanism, and error reduction guidelines (Doytchev and Szwillus, 2009). 
The Technique for the Retrospective and predictive Analysis of Cognitive Errors 
(TRACEr) was initially intended as a technique to specifically consider air traffic control hazards 
and preventative measures (Shorrock and Kirwan, 2002).  TRACEr employs numerous 
taxonomies in the analysis of the cognitive factors affecting the operator’s performance and the 
work environment (Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2017).  The method's design for use as a 
retrospective and prospective tool provides comprehensive analysis with a variety of applications 
but may also be overly complicated and time-consuming in practice. 
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The Generic Error Modelling System (GEMS) established by Reason (1990) is based on 
the works of Rouse (1981) and Rasmussen (1983).  Using Rasmussen’s (1983) SRK model, 
GEMS utilizes a sequential analysis of these behaviors to describe the error modes of the system 
(Reason, 1990).  The method examines the behaviors before and after the event happens.  Errors 
occurring before the problem has been noticed are classified as monitoring errors.  Those errors 
occurring after that are known as problem-solving errors.  Reason (1990) further divides skill-
based errors into those resulting from inattention and over attention.  Rule-based errors can 
develop from misapplication of proper rules and the application of bad rules.  Knowledge-based 
errors proceed from the following categories: selectivity, workspace limitations, out of sight out 
of mind, confirmation bias, overconfidence, biased reviewing, illusory correlation, halo effects, 
problems with causality, and problems with complexity.  
The AcciMap approach was developed by Rasmussen (1997) to examine events 
considering the complicated interactions in socio-technical systems.  The method presents a 
multi-level diagram showing how causal factors are related to physical events, conditions, or 
processes, and organizational or external elements contributed to the accident.  Then these 
factors are connected based on their dependence on other layers of factors and ultimately with 
the outcome.  AcciMap provides a comprehensive examination of the factors involved in an 
accident, as well as how they are linked with other factors (Branford et al., 2011).  
The Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) created by Hollnagel (2004) 
studies accidents based on performance probability and how system factors occurring together 
can result in conditions that surpass limitations for normal operations.  FRAM is dependent on 
the ability to provide the likelihood of system functions as well as the insight to establish 
functional resonance limitations.  This method also offers the opportunity to introduce 
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preventative measures and how they would prospectively influence the functional resonance of 
the system (Hollnagel, 2012). 
A Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a prospective method to examine the 
various potential manners of system failure and their impacts.  It is similar to the retrospective 
root cause analysis method of conducting investigations to determine their cause or causes of an 
accident.  FMEA is a structured, qualitative risk assessment tool that aims to identify, evaluate, 
and mitigate potential failures proactively.  The origins of FMEA are attributed to United States 
military procedures, and it is widely applied within the Unites States National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (Sheridan, 2008).  FMEA is also an important part of the Lean Six Sigma 
method of product and performance improvement (Mekki, 2006).  
A Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study is beneficial for the identification of hazards 
and risks in an industrial plant or environment (Kletz, 1974).  HAZOP studies are prospective 
methods that are generally conducted with a specialized team of four to eight experienced 
personnel familiar with the proposed operations.  Each subsystem is analyzed in a detailed 
fashion with regard to design intent and deviations from the specified operating parameters.  
Guide words appropriate to the system or process are utilized to ensure the team considers 
overall objectives.  Although the method provides substantial insight into system processes and 
operations, HAZOP studies are generally expensive and time-intensive (Gould et al., 2000).  
The Potential Human Error and Cause Analysis (PHECA) was developed by Whalley 
(1987) for the chemical processing industry.  This method uses performance shaping factors or 
error categories similar to THERP and SHERPA.  Process, personnel, and ergonomic groups are 
typical performance shaping factors.  PHECA involves the analysis of various operational data, 
including accident reports, medical and operational records, and logbooks combined with the use 
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of computer analysis in the identification of human errors contributing to accidents 
(Grozdanovic, 2001; Kim and Jung, 2003). 
2.5 Accident analysis 
 After an accident occurs, a systematic and objective investigation is conducted to 
determine the cause or causes of the accident.  Though accident analysis may, at times, be 
considered a portion of the accident investigation, it may also be utilized to evaluate 
recommendations and trends supported by the investigation (Hollnagel and Speziali, 2008).  As 
industries and transportation methods involve greater use of technology, the complexity 
surrounding accidents and socio-technical systems has required innovative approaches to 
investigate and analyze these accidents (Underwood and Waterson, 2013a).  Hollnagel and 
Goteman (2004) proposed three divisions to classify accident analysis methods: sequential 
techniques, epidemiological techniques, and systemic techniques.  Sequential techniques include 
fault tree analysis, event/consequence tree analysis, and root cause analysis (Hollnagel and 
Speziali, 2008; Bowo et al., 2017) that evaluate linear, cause-and-effect type accidents 
(Underwood and Waterson, 2013).  Epidemiological techniques consider latent and active 
contributions to accidents and were named for their similarities to the distribution of illness and 
disease as compared to how latent factors negatively impact organizational and supervisory 
conditions within the system (Qureshi, 2007; Underwood and Waterson, 2013a).  Examples of 
epidemiological techniques are the Swiss cheese model (Reason, 1990) and the Human Factors 
Analysis and Classification System (Wiegmann and Shappell, 2003).  Systemic methods 
evaluate the interactions between system components as critical to the understanding of how a 
system operates or fails (Underwood and Waterson, 2013a).  Techniques such as AcciMap 
(Rasmussen, 1997), FRAM (Hollnagel, 2004), and STAMP (Leveson, 2004) provide an 
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enhanced level of system comprehension and dependency on control limitations when analyzing 
an accident (Underwood and Waterson, 2013a). 
 Hollnagel (2008) outlined various theories for comparing accident investigation and 
analysis methods.  Benner (1985) proposed ten criteria to compare methods of accident 
investigation, including encouragement, independence, initiatives, discovery, competence, 
standards, enforcement, states, accuracy, and closed-loop.  Hollnagel (1998) produced six criteria 
to classify and compare accident methods, namely analytic capability, technical basis, relation to 
existing taxonomies, practicality, and cost-effectiveness.  Perrow (1984), in his discussion of 
socio-technical systems and motivated by the Three Mile Island accident, presented a model with 
two criteria: interactions and coupling. Interactions are described on a scale from linear to 
complex.  Linear system interactions are described as having flexibility and freedom in 
components and personnel assignments: linear systems have thoroughly known operations and 
responses.  Complex system interactions, by contrast, are optimized by design.  While 
component design and integration are finely tuned, there may not be complete comprehension of 
how the system may respond under certain conditions or when various subsystems interact.  
Coupling is a measure of system and subsystem dependency; while loose coupling may be 
indicated by variability in the system, tight coupling is more specific regarding built-in 
redundancy, critical logistical support, and necessary timelines.  Using the combinations of linear 
and complex interactions with loose and tight coupling results in Perrow’s (1984) four quadrant 













Figure 3: Perrow’s interactions/coupling chart.  Adapted from Perrow (1984). 
 
 The chart includes numerous industries, transportation modes, governmental, and educational 
organizations.  Maritime and rail transportation are examples of quadrant one enterprises.  While 
the operation of these modes is very complicated and timeliness is critical to performance, 
component isolation and response knowledge are high.  Quadrant two represents complex 
interactions and tight coupling activities, including nuclear power plants.  Nuclear power plants 
are characterized by a large number of radiological, mechanical, electronic, and personnel 
subsystems operating and interacting with each other.  System interactions and responses may be 
unpredictable or unstable.  Personnel are assigned to very specialized positions, and operations 
rely, at times, on incomplete information sources and system understanding.  Further, the system 
is dependent on proper procedures that must be followed, designed redundancies, with little 
room for time variations or delays.  Factories, especially assembly plants, are typical quadrant 
three applications because of separate production activities with minimal unexpected system 


































feedback.  While production delays are not desired, system safety is not affected by these delays.   
Also, excess parts, supplies, and personnel can ensure that production continues as intended.  
Universities are model quadrant four organizations, as their loose coupling is shown through 
their capacity to withstand delays, changing sequences, and varying personnel.  They also pursue 
the simultaneous objectives of education, research, and public information.  Furthermore, their 
large number of students, faculty, different colleges, and numerous fields of study lead to 
complex interactions between these various systems (Perrow, 1984). 
 Hollnagel and Speziali (2008) use Perrow’s (1984) interactions/coupling quadrant 
numbers to match accident analysis technique groupings.  Quadrant one activities, associated 
with linear interactions and tight coupling, are best suited for epidemiological techniques. 
Enterprises identified with tight coupling and complex interactions, located in quadrant two, are 
appropriate for systemic techniques.  Loose coupling and linear interaction operations in 
quadrant three fit the sequential techniques (Hollnagel and Speziali, 2008).   
2.6 Method summary and selection consideration for the current study 
 The variety of HRA, HEI, and accident analysis techniques raises obvious questions of 
how to select a proper method for a particular research topic or the most effective method for a 
subject.  The literature contains many examples comparing these methods, as noted in Table 4.  
Several methods are considered to be representatives of more than one of the categories as HRA, 
HEI, or accident analysis.  This complicates the manner of selection of a particular method.  
While some studies describe the differences between methods within their specific area of HRA, 
HEI, or accident analysis (Kirwan, 1992b; Hollnagel and Speziali, 2008; Bell and Holroyd, 
2009), others may compare and contrast these methods across the areas.  Most of the methods in 
Table 4 appear in only one of the three categories.  However, several methods are listed in two of  
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Table 4. List of various techniques associated in the literature under the categories of human 
reliability assessment, human error identification, or accident analysis methods (Kirwan, 1992b; 
Hollnagel, 1996; Kirwan, 1997; Rantanen et al., 2006; Hollnagel and Speziali, 2008; Bell and 
Holroyd, 2009; Doytchev and Szwillus, 2009; Cheng et al., 2013; Underwood and Waterson, 
2013a, Underwood and Waterson, 2013b; Alvarenga et al., 2014; Cheng and Hwang, 2015; 
Akyuz, 2015; Akyuz and Celik, 2015a; Akyuz and Celik, 2015b; Ung, 2015; Akyuz et al., 2016; 
Akyuz and Celik, 2016; Bowo et al., 2017; Islam et al., 2017; Kim et al., 2017; Calvo Olivares et 
al., 2018; Grant et al., 2018; Ung, 2018). 
Human Reliability Analysis Human Error Identification Accident Analysis 
AcciMap ATHEANA AcciMap 
AIPA CADA AEB 
APJ CBDTM ANP 
ASEP CES BA 
ATHEANA CREAM CA 
CAHR FMEA Critical Path 
CARA GEMS CREAM 
CES HAZOP Drift into Failure Model 
CESA HEART Domino Model 
CODA HEIST ECFC 
COGENT HERA ECFCA 
CREAM HET ETA 
FRAM HFACS Five Whys 
HCR HRMS FRAM 
HEART IMAS FTA 
HRMS K-HRA HERA 
IDAC NARA HFACS 
IDHEAS PHECA HFIT 
INTENT SHERPA HPES 
JHEDI SLIM MTO 
MERMOS SLIM-MAUD Normal Accident Theory 
NARA SPAR-H PEAT 
OATS SRK RCA 
PC THERP Risk Management Framework 
RARA TRACEr SCAT 
SLIM   STAMP 
SLIM-MAUD   STEP 
SMoC   Swiss Cheese Model 
SPAR-H   TRACEr 
STAMP     
TESEO     




the categories. CREAM is a recognized method appearing in the literature as an appropriate 
technique for HRA, HEI, and accident analysis.  This apparent dilemma is a reminder of 
Singleton’s (1972) comments regarding the classification of methods used to evaluate human 
error.  As Bell and Holroyd (2009) pointed out, several of the HRA methods were devised 
specifically for the nuclear power industry and may not be adaptable for other applications or 
may not be publicly available.  This statement can be generalized to stipulate that the 
modification of any HRA, HEI, or accident analysis methods for an application other than what 
it was developed for may not be successful.  This is the first consideration in the method 
selection process. 
Despite the extensive use and dependency on maritime commerce, available statistics to 
support human error probability calculations are generally lacking.  Kirwan (1997) describes 
human error probability as the ratio of error observations compared to error opportunities.  Ung 
(2018) identified the challenge of quantifying human error analysis due to the extreme absence 
of necessary data associated with maritime accidents.  The National Research Council (1991) 
discussed the inherent data challenges in the commercial fishing industry.  Issues that contribute 
to the less than optimal data include accident reporting rates, accident investigation 
thoroughness, unclear national and state accident reporting and vessel registration requirements, 
full time and part-time employment, and a lack of insurance covering vessels and employees.   
These statistical issues indicate that quantitative HRA and HEI methods may be difficult to 
substantiate for use in the study of human error in the maritime transportation and specifically 




 Recalling the works of Perrow (1984), Hollnagel and Speziali (2008), and Underwood 
and Waterson (2013a) is beneficial to the selection of an appropriate human error analysis 
method for the current study.  The accident analysis technique for a specific industry should be 
applied appropriately for an effective examination of an accident and future prevention efforts.  
Maritime transportation is identified in quadrant one indicating tight coupling and linear 
interactions.  Hollnagel and Speziali (2008) and Underwood and Waterson (2013a) proposed that 
epidemiological techniques such as the Swiss cheese model and HFACS are best suited for 
quadrant one activities due to the influence of active and latent causal factors involved in these 
accidents.  This is the third consideration in the method selection process.  Combining these 
three considerations provides the ideal way to proceed.  The elimination of those techniques not 
adaptable for maritime transportation and those techniques which include quantification, together 
with Hollnagel and Speziali’s (2008) implementation of Perrow’s (1984) interactions/coupling, 





Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) 
3.1 Reason’s Swiss cheese model   
Reason (1990, 1997, 2000, and 2003) argued that the causes of accidents attributed to 
human error are the result of latent failures and active failures.  Latent failures are those often 
hidden conditions that present the real risk for accidents.  These latent failures are generally due 
to priorities, culture, procedures, and decisions within an organization that may have been in 
place for a considerable time before the accident occurred.  Latent failures are built into the 
system either intentionally or inadvertently.  They may have been present in the system for days 
or decades.  They may represent a disguised hazard that was never envisioned to cause an 
accident or one that was not thoroughly evaluated as a potential risk.  While active failures may 
serve the final initiating event for accidents due to some error in judgment or decision making on 
the part of the operator and may be listed as the cause of the accident, the latent failures are 
generally more to blame.  Operators may be the final link of an accident chain, but as Reason 
(1990) notes: 
Rather than being the main instigators of an accident, operators tend to be inheritors of 
system defects created by poor design, incorrect installation, faulty maintenance, and bad 
management decisions.  Their part is usually that of adding the final garnish to a lethal 
brew whose ingredients have already been long in the cooking (p. 173). 
These active and latent failures are evident in the groupings of organizational factors, 
supervisory factors, preconditions for the unsafe act, and unsafe acts.  Causal factors associated 
with organizational influences, unsafe supervision, and preconditions for unsafe acts are latent 
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failures.  Those related to unsafe acts are active failures (Reason, 1990; Akyuz et al., 2016; 










Figure 4. Swiss cheese model showing the role of layered defenses that cause or prevent 




Human error is commonly expressed as having a sharp or pointy end and a blunt end.  The sharp 
end represents the operator, whether it is a ship's captain, pilot, physician, or others, as an active 
failure.  The blunt end represents latent failures and refers to the organization, administration, 
suppliers, or regulators (Reason, 1990).  Rasmussen (1990) wrote that accidents are generally not 
due to some intentionally improper decision but through some breakdown in the system, which 
caused a loss of control or a flawed decision by the operator.  The Swiss cheese model provides 









3.2 HFACS development 
The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) model was created to 
understand the causes of naval aviation accidents (Shappell and Wiegmann, 2001).  The factors 
that contribute to these accidents, often occurring at high speed with significant personnel and 
mission impact, were critical in determining how to avoid repeating known and tragic 
circumstances.  The HFACS shows the importance of human factors on these accidents and 
makes corrective actions more likely.  For the proper application of HFACS, a detailed 
investigation and database are necessary to correctly document all causal factors, including 
human error in an accident.  Historically, accident investigations focused on the last actions of 
the operator or the final minutes before the accident without examining and categorizing all of 
the organizational, supervisory, and pre-conditional factors that put the operator in the position 
for the accident to occur (Dekker, 2006).  While organizations and management will tend to 
blame the operators for accidents, Dekker (2017) disputes that in the following: 
Its four basic assumptions were that people have a clearly defined utility function that 
allows them to index alternatives, according to their desirability, that they have an 
exhaustive view of decision alternatives, that they can foresee the probability of each 
alternative scenario, and that they can choose among these to achieve the highest 
subjective utility (p. 554). 
Where aviation has rapidly and dramatically changed its technology and its importance in 
society during the last century, maritime transportation has existed for millennia but has not 
experienced the same rapid innovation as aviation.  The maritime sector is comprised of 
numerous vessel types based on the commodity they carry and the waters they need to transit for 
the delivery of the product.  Vessels often operate in challenging environments and weather 
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conditions.  Their size, function, and capabilities all contribute to how they successfully interact 
with each other.  In addition, although 90% of worldwide trade is carried by commercial vessels 
(Sulaiman et al., 2011), maritime accidents generally tend to lack the ability to capture public 
interest and are seen as less newsworthy than aviation accidents as presented in Table 5.  
Maritime applications of HFACS show considerable potential to prevent accidents that result in 
loss of life and property.  
 
Table 5: Top ten aviation and maritime disasters since 1900 not caused by terrorism or military 
conflict (Watson, 1995; Chiles, 2002; Republic of Senegal, 2002; Panama Maritime Authority, 
2006; Pike, 2008; Eyers, 2013; Gero, 2017). 
Aviation accidents Fatalities Maritime accidents Fatalities 
Canary Islands runway collision 
(1977) 583 Doña Paz collision and sinking (1987) 4386 
Japan Airlines flight 123 crash (1985) 520 




Mid-air collision near Charkhi Dadri 
(1996) 349 LeJoola capsizing (2002) 1863 
Turkish Airlines flight 981 crash 
(1974) 346 
Titanic iceberg collision and sinking 
(1912) 1513 
Saudi Arabian flight 163 runway fire 
(1980) 301 Taiping collision and sinking (1949) 
1500 
(estimated) 
Iranian military flight crash (2003) 275 




American Airlines flight 191 crash 
(1979) 273 Toyu Maru sinking (1954) 
1153 
(estimated) 
American Airlines flight 587 crash 
(2001) 265 Al Salam Boccaccio 98 sinking (2006) 1031 
China Airlines flight 140 crash (1994) 264 
Empress of Ireland collision and sinking 
(1914) 1012 
Nigeria Airways flight 2120 crash 





Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) used the four tiers suggested by Reason (1990, 1997) of 
organizational influences, unsafe supervision, preconditions for unsafe acts, and unsafe acts as 
the basis for HFACS.  Then they expanded the tiers into categories and subcategories that were 
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based on six psychological theories of human error that contributed to HFACS (Wiegmann and 
Shappell, 2003): cognitive, ergonomic, behavioral, aeromedical, psychosocial, and 
organizational.  The cognitive perspective refers to how the operator processes the information as 
part of a stimulus/response or input/output.  Rasmussen (1983) and Wickens and Flach (1988) 
describe a process where stimuli are received, mentally processed and evaluated for the 
assessment and recognition of a known pattern to form a decision and finally lead to a response 
or action taken.  The ergonomic perspective has to do with the human, machine, and 
environment interface.  Edwards’ (1988) SHEL model is a systems-based approach to coordinate 
software, hardware, environment, and liveware for effective design and operation.  The 
behavioral perspective is related to the motivation and punishment or reward system of the 
operator. Peterson (1971) and Skinner (1974) theorized that performance is optimized through 
proper motivation, rewards, and satisfaction.  The aeromedical perspective considers the medical 
and psychological condition of the operator that may have contributed to the accident.  Though 
initially envisioned for aviation, Wiegmann and Shappell's (2003) explanation of the 
aeromedical perspective is relevant to all accident types where non-optimal physical or mental 
conditions may contribute to operator error.  The psychosocial perspective examines the 
interactions between the various members associated with the operation.  For example, in 
maritime applications, the different crew positions, port and facility support services, shoreside 
maintenance contractors, and others all contribute to the safe operation of the vessel.  The 
organizational perspective models accidents as an uninterrupted succession of factors and 
incidents that the various management levels must identify and control.  The domino theories of 
accident causation, originally proposed by Heinrich (1931) and modified by Bird (1974), refer to 



































social environment, fault of the person, unsafe act and mechanical or physical hazard, accident, 
and resulting injuries.  Bird (1974) discussed failures within the organization in the factors of 
safety/loss of control, basic causes, intermediate causes, accident, and resulting injuries. 
3.3 HFACS model 
The HFACS model is comprised of tiers, categories, and subcategories, as shown in 
Figure 5 and briefly described in Table 6.  The highest tier in HFACS is organizational 
influences (Wiegmann and Shappell, 2003).  In both large and small organizations, upper 
management has specific policies and expectations for work processes and logistical support for 
the organization.  In addition to written procedures, there may be an unwritten manner of doing 
business.  Although top management may feel they are not responsible when an accident occurs 
with one of their assets, that may be removed from them geographically or administratively, 
these organizational factors and subfactors are likely to have some influence on the accident.  
Corporately, a mindset regarding safety is established, either directly or inferentially.  This 
mindset may also be concluded from maintenance and acquisition budgets or the tolerated safety 
risks that are taken to remain profitable.  Funding for repair, maintenance, or acquiring a new 
asset represents a commitment by the organization to reliable and safe equipment that will 
maximize operations and minimize accidents.  In the absence of specific guidance provided by 
the organization, operators may make decisions based on their opinions of corporate strategy and 
culture.  A recent example of an accident that occurred due to latent organizational influences 
demonstrates the dangers associated with confined space entry.  A crewmember was killed, and 




Table 6. HFACS category descriptions. Adapted from Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) and 
Shappell et al. (2007). 
Organizational influences   
  Resource management: Acquisition, allocation, and utilization of equipment and personnel 
  Organizational climate: Informal, often undocumented, but reality-based considerations of 
how decisions are made and how operations are conducted 
  
Organizational process: Documented procedures of operations, risk, and quality 
management oversight 
Unsafe Supervision   
  Inadequate supervision: Management to ensure technical and professional personnel and 
equipment readiness for operations 
  Planned inappropriate operations: Assessment of mission to ensure success considering 
risk factors, personnel assignment, and  equipment limitations 
  Failure to correct known problems: Operational authorization despite previously identified 
unresolved personnel and equipment shortcomings 
  Supervisory violations: Intentional non-compliance of management overseeing operation 
with applicable standards and procedures  
Preconditions for unsafe acts   
Environmental factors Physical environment: Natural and atmospheric conditions and their impact on the operator 
  
Technological environment: Design, installation, and function of equipment and its 
interaction with operators 
Condition of operators 
Adverse mental states: Psychological or cognitive impairment that impacts operator 
performance 
  
Adverse physiological states: Medical or physical impairment that impacts operator 
performance 
  Physical/mental limitations: Medical or cognitive obstacles or restrictions that impact the 
operators’ abilities and mission performance 
Personnel factors 
Crew resource management: Ineffective interactions between crew members and their 
impact on operations 
  
Personnel readiness: Lack of preparedness for operation due to inattention to standard off-
duty protocol 
Unsafe acts   
Errors Skill-based errors: Faulty actions based on inattention to a process or technique  
  Decision errors: Intentional actions inappropriate for the situation due to poor choices 
  Perceptual errors: Improper actions based on defective sensory input and evaluation 
Violations Routine: Deliberate actions that may be common practice and viewed as relatively minor 
but are against standard procedures 
  




depleted of all oxygen on the fishing vessel Sunbeam during a maintenance period (Marine 
Accident Investigations Branch, 2018a).  While factors from other HFACS tiers contributed to 
this accident as well, the lack of procedures for this risky operation, the lack of equipment and 
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professional services necessary to ensure safe entry into the tank, and the culture to proceed 
without assessing all of the threats all show a lack of organizational involvement in this case. 
Unsafe supervision is the second tier in the HFACS model and occurs at a level above the 
operator, where decisions could be made to assist the operator or terminate the operation 
altogether (Wiegmann and Shappell, 2003).  Inadequate supervision also includes items such as 
failure to provide proper training and failure to ensure sufficient rest for the operators. Examples 
of planned inappropriate operations also include proper crew selection.  Failure to correct a 
known problem can also be seen in knowingly operating a vessel with a leaking hull or 
inadequate fire protection.  It may also be observed by not learning from or documenting near 
misses or unsafe tendencies.  Unsafe supervision has active and passive components.  
Supervisors have a responsibility for the operations being conducted with matters in their 
purview that are directly evident as well as those that may require some degree of analysis.  
Regardless, a supervisor's communication, or lack thereof, further impacts the operator’s 
decisions and actions.  A fatal fishing vessel accident illustrates unsafe supervision.  A 
crewmember was killed aboard the fishing vessel Enterprise when his leg was caught in a rope 
while the fishing gear was being set.  He was dragged overboard, pulled underwater, and 
drowned (Marine Accident Investigations Branch, 2018b).  Among the HFACS factors 
concluded from the investigation were the unsafe supervision categories of inadequate 
supervision, planned inappropriate operations, failure to correct a known problem, and 
supervisory violations.  In this case, the supervisor failed to ensure that the crewmember stayed 
in the designated safe location on the main deck while the fishing gear was being set.  In 
addition, there was a failure to correct a known problem since the deceased crewmember had 
done this previously despite warnings from other crewmembers. 
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The preconditions of unsafe acts level examine the operator’s background conditions that 
may influence unsafe acts (Wiegmann and Shappell, 2003).  The physical environment refers to 
weather conditions, time of day (including nighttime or sun glare).  The technological 
environment considers ergonomic concerns and the ease of using controls. The condition of 
operators includes physiological and psychological factors in accidents.  Adverse mental states 
include many factors that lead to a loss of concentration, whether due to stress, distraction, and 
complacency, among others.  Adverse physiological states consider illness, fatigue, prescription 
medication, as well as others.  Physical/mental limitations may address a lack of operator 
experience that may cause an operator to be overwhelmed and can also address limited reaction 
time due to visibility factors.  Personnel factors include crew resource management and 
personnel readiness factors.  Crew resource management considers a variety of factors, including 
poor communications within the operational team as well as a lack of teamwork.  Personal 
readiness covers poor physical preparation, including improper rest and inadequate nutrition.  A 
recent accident occurred and was investigated that highlights the category of personnel factors.  
A crew of 44 was forced to abandon the fishing vessel American Eagle after a fire started due to 
oxy-acetylene cutting operations to replace a valve.  Although no injuries were reported, 
firefighting efforts were negatively impacted due to a lack of a common language of the 
crewmembers from seven countries (National Transportation Safety Board, 2017).  This 
communication problem emphasized the importance of team coordination in an emergency.  This 
situation also exposes the supervisory issue regarding crew selection. 
The final tier of HFACS is unsafe acts (Wiegmann and Shappell, 2003).  Errors are 
operational breakdowns that may still be within organizational rules and procedures.  Violations 
indicate a disregard for these rules.  Skill-based errors may include missed checklist items, 
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missed procedures, or improper actions.  Decision errors may be honest mistakes or cases where 
the operator did not have sufficient experience for the conditions encountered.  Perceptual errors 
consider illusions, disorientation, or judgment errors affecting distance, speed, and other 
operational characteristics. Routine violations may indicate a regular practice of not following 
the rules that were thought inconsequential.  Exceptional violations include severe departures 
from accepted standards, including exceeding safe operational parameters and intentional 
dangerous operations.  Skill-based errors, decision errors, and perception errors all contributed to 
a collision between the motor vessel Jag Amov and the motor vessel Total Response that 
occurred off of the coast of Australia when both vessels failed to maintain a proper lookout 
(Australian Transport Safety Bureau, 2018).  Furthermore, crewmembers failed to use the 
information from their electronic navigational equipment, and the mate on watch on the Jag 
Amov improperly assessed the situation and failed to take avoidance actions after concluding that 
they would not collide with the Total Response. 
3.4 HFACS application 
Previous analysis of maritime accident investigations using HFACS generally focused on 
specific incidents or accident types but employed a variety of analysis methods.  Celik and Cebi 
(2008) applied HFACS in conjunction with a fuzzy analytic process to study the role of human 
factors in a boiler explosion.  This study was conducted on a dry bulk carrier and produced 
weighted contributing factors of the accident.  Schröder-Hinrichs et al. (2011) examined human 
error in 41 machinery space fires using an adapted HFACS model.  This study focused on causal 
organizational factors and utilized an additional tier for outside factors.  Chauvin et al. (2013) 
addressed the HFACS framework tailored to ship collision accident investigations.  They also 
considered a fifth tier of outside factors in this HFACS adaptation.  Akhtar and Utne (2013) 
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combined HFACS and the risk associated with ship groundings.  Data were collected from 93 
ship groundings and specifically explored the link between crew fatigue and groundings.  Chen 
et al. (2013) proposed an HFACS–Maritime Accidents (MA) model in their review of the Herald 
of Free Enterprise accident.  This study concentrated its analysis on human and organizational 
factors of this maritime tragedy.  Mazaheri et al. (2015) created HFACS–Ground in their review 
of accident investigations of ship groundings.  Their examination combined human error and risk 
analysis.  Soner et al. (2015) used an HFACS and a fuzzy cognitive mapping approach to 
identify the causes of fire safety issues.  This HFACS modification analyzed fire safety 
deficiencies to improve prevention efforts.  Ozdemir et al. (2015) employed HFACS and 
multiple criteria decision-making to study human error in maritime accidents.  Their resulting 
analysis identified and ranked the contributing factors in the maritime accidents they considered.  
Zhang et al. (2016) focused on collisions between ships as they examined HFACS data with a 
risk analysis model.  This study used interval probability and Bayesian network modeling to 
evaluate the accident data.  Akyuz (2016) proposed a model to assess HFACS with the analytic 
network process in the investigation of a liquefied petroleum gas leak aboard a liquefied gas 
carrier.  The resulting model produced weighted causal factors of the accident.  Yildirim (2017) 
applied the HFACS-MA framework with chi-square and correspondence analysis to examine 
ship collisions and groundings.  This study utilized data from specific accident types to 
generalize the human error analysis for all types of maritime accidents. 
These studies offer valuable tools, processes, and analyses to investigate serious 
casualties on oceangoing international tank ships and freight ships.   Oceangoing ships, subject to 
international Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) requirements, classification society standards, and 
the various national regulations of every country they visit, generally have robust corporations to 
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deal with these complexities.  These corporations know that to be successful and profitable 
businesses they must hire a workforce that is able to satisfy all portions of maritime operations 
management.  That includes providing crews for their ships that have appropriate documentation 
attesting to their compliance with the International Maritime Organization’s convention on 
Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping (STCW).  These professional 
requirements ensure consistent levels of competence covering all mandatory shipboard positions 
as described by Chauvin et al. (2013).  The International Safety Management (ISM) Code is 
another example of maritime requirements that a shipping company must support within their 
organization.  The ISM Code is a quality management system where the company’s leadership 
provides expectations for organizational responsibility, personnel support, and the operation and 
maintenance of ships as noted by Batalen and Sydnes (2014).  If implemented correctly, the 
company’s safety management system should address many of the categories within HFACS. 
Commercial fishing vessels, on the other hand, usually do not have the same level of 
organizational support.  STCW and ISM represent two major guidelines that took effect in 1998 
that are applicable to oceangoing commercial ships (Chauvin et al., 2013) but generally not to 
commercial fishing vessels.  The need for personnel qualification and safety management 
systems were noted by the National Research Council (1991) and NIOSH (1994) and constitute 
vulnerabilities that still exist.  These two areas are challenging to most commercial fishing 
companies that do not have the financial resources to hire personnel to address them voluntarily.  
However, as Chauvin et al. (2013) expressed, the organizational and human factors that they 
represent pose significant hazards to their vessels’ operations. 
The actual distribution of human factors contributing to commercial fishing vessel 
accidents will be unique and not previously documented in the research.  The resulting HFACS 
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adaptation will be generalizable to all maritime accidents but should be especially valuable to 
commercial maritime accidents involving small business operations. 
3.5 Commercial fishing vessel safety 
Safety issues have always been present in the commercial fishing industry.  Junger (1997) 
wrote that approximately 10,000 commercial fishermen have died since 1650 from Gloucester, 
Massachusetts, the renowned center of the fishing industry in New England.  The historic fishing 
industry did not have the technological tools that are available in the present day.  The vessels 
were more susceptible to flooding and sinking, long-range weather forecasting was an 
unimaginable concept, and the setting and retrieving of fishing gear was done by hand.  The 
harvests of cod and mackerel were plentiful and ensured the continuity of the industry despite the 
inherent safety risks and the recognized loss of life in the community (Junger, 1997).   
Safety considerations in the fishing industry today are divided into the components of the 
vessel, the crew, and external factors (National Research Council, 1991).  The vessel category 
includes how a ship is built, maintained, and equipped.  Crew factors include the competencies 
of the mariners to navigate and operate the vessel and the skills needed for their fishery.  
External factors consider wide-ranging topics covering regulatory compliance, including 
management of the fishery, business economics of bringing the catch to market, and 
environmental conditions such as weather and sea state. 
The design of a fishing vessel is directly related to the type of aquatic species being 
harvested. In turn, this species will determine where the vessel will operate and what equipment 
is necessary for the fishery (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2016; Alaska Department of Fish 
and Game Division of Commercial Fisheries, 2005).  Fishery operations conducted on inland 
sounds and bays generally utilize smaller vessels with smaller crews.  Fisheries conducted 
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offshore have larger boats and larger crews (U.S. Coast Guard, 2008).  It is essential to 
understand the financial implications of vessel design, maintenance, and outfitting.  As with any 
business, funding priorities influence many decisions.  Decisions regarding the expected useful 
life of a vessel, maintenance frequency, and the state and age of the technology utilized in the 
fishery represent business risk variables that may be evaluated differently based on their attitudes 
as risk-averse, risk-neutral, or risk-seeking (Pinto and Garvey, 2013).  Greenlaw (1999) 
described a regimen of regular engine maintenance to minimize costly, unplanned repairs.  
Conversely, Wang et al. (2005) concluded that many fishing vessel accidents showed very 
minimal maintenance which was directly related to mechanical failures. 
The equipment related to the fishery harvest is a significant safety hazard to crew 
members on a commercial fishing vessel.  Accidents involving rotating winches and heavy loads, 
throwing gear over the side of the boat and retrieving it, or being struck by any moving object or 
apparatus are among some of the ways that deck machinery represents a considerable hazard for 
the crew.  The extent to which the vessel is equipped with the most technologically available 
protective devices, including remote stops and machinery guards, is another factor to consider 
(Jaleel and Grewal, 2017). 
The crew aboard fishing vessels faces numerous hazards.  Greenlaw (1999) described the 
fatiguing schedule of a long-liner sword fishing voyage with an average of three to four hours of 
sleep per night after each physically grueling workday.  This schedule could last for two weeks 
or two months until the fish hold was full.  The work requires concentration in the midst of 
repetitive motions and actions while working on slippery decks in various weather and ocean 
conditions (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012). Injuries due to fishing hooks and gaffs or 
landed fish before they are safely stowed in the fish hold, represent common hazards that after a 
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long day of work and without a trained medical professional aboard, can quickly become life-
threatening (Junger, 1997; Greenlaw, 1999).  
External factors, though possibly viewed as less important than the vessel or the crew 
with regard to safety, play an important role in fishing vessel accidents.  The goal of commercial 
fishing, like any business, is to make a profit.  Receiving a high price for the catch onboard the 
boat is dependent upon the size of the catch and its price per pound.  The price per pound 
depends on the supply of the catch in the marketplace and consumer demand.  As Greenlaw 
(1999) wrote, a fishing trip that produced a large amount of fish could show a disappointing 
profit due to a low market price.  The commercial fishing industry aims to get a catch to market 
as soon as possible, not only for maximum freshness but to beat competitors for a better market 
price (Junger, 1997; National Research Council, 1991). 
Another significant external safety factor is fishery management.  Fishery management is 
closely related to the business side of fishing and is meant to promote conservation by preventing 
overfishing of a species (National Research Council, 1991).  The fishing industry, in an effort to 
maximize profits while minimizing expenses, found it advantageous to fish in one location, 
preferably close to the home port, to catch as many fish as possible and get them quickly to 
market.  The resulting problem is taking more fish than can be replenished naturally.  Fishery 
management can cover who can catch the fish, what species they can catch, where they can catch 
the fish, when they can catch the fish, how they can catch the fish, and why these efforts are 
necessary (National Research Council, 1991; Junger, 1997; U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services, 1994).  The Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 
established national sovereignty over aquatic species within 200 miles of the coasts of the United 
States.  The intent was to limit foreign fishing vessels from operating and harvesting fish 
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adjacent to the United States’ shoreline.  The act also provides for regional fisheries management 
councils (Junger, 1997).  Fishery management is not a popular topic in the commercial fishing 
industry.  While preserving or rebuilding fish stocks, fishery management may mean that vessel 
crews need to travel further to catch their fish or be time-constrained within a fishery area with 
the unintended consequence of safety risks due to exposure to poor weather conditions (National 
Research Council, 1991; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1994; Jin et al., 2001).  
These decisions made by regulators or other external parties can impact the safety of fishing 
vessels. 
3.6 Conclusion 
 HFACS progressive application, from its initial development as a tool to analyze military 
aviation accidents, through various other commercial and military transportation segments, as 
well as industrial and healthcare settings, demonstrates its robust design and flexibility.  
Modifying HFACS for the commercial fishing industry must incorporate organizations of all 
sizes where frequently crewmembers are “self-employed” and work for shares of the profit 
(Drudi, 1998; Greenlaw, 1999; Lincoln, 2006).  In a competitive and dangerous industry that 
minimizes organizational overhead, the obstacles of hiring and retaining competent and capable 
personnel as well as a systematic method for companies to assess and respond to operational 
risks and hazards will need to be considered and reflected in this new model.  Table 7 shows a 
comparison between Wiegmann and Shappell’s (2003) model and the HFACS-Fishing Vessel 
(FV) showing tiers, categories, and subcategories that will be discussed in more depth in the next 






Table 7: Comparison between Wiegmann and Shappell’s (2003) model and the HFACS-FV. 
Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) HFACS-FV 
Organizational influences Organizational influences 
Resource management Resource management 
  Human resources 
  Equipment acquisition and support 
Organizational climate Climate 
  Structure 
  Safety culture 
Organizational process Process 
  Procedures 
  Risk/systems management 
Unsafe supervision Unsafe management 
Inadequate supervision Poor supervision 
  Technical readiness of crew 
  Supervisory competency 
Planned inappropriate operations Improper operational risk assessment 
Failure to correct known problems Allowing unsafe operations 
Supervisory violations Supervisory violations 
Preconditions for unsafe acts Preconditions for unsafe acts 
Environmental factors Environmental factors 
Physical environment Physical environment 
Technological environment Technological environment 
Condition of operators Crew condition 
Adverse mental states Mental readiness 
Adverse physiological states Physical readiness 
Physical/mental limitations   
Personnel factors Personnel factors 
Crew resource management Crew communication 
Personal readiness Personal readiness 
Unsafe acts Unsafe acts 
Errors Errors 
Skill-based errors Skill-based errors 
Decision errors Decision errors 










 This chapter will detail the modification of the HFACS model for fishing vessel 
accidents, the data that will be considered for this study, and how raters will employ the modified 
HFACS version using this data.  The stepwise research methodology is enumerated here as well 
as shown in Figure 6.   
1. Review existing HFACS model and identify which categories need to be updated to 
reflect organizations and operations on commercial fishing industry vessels.  Make 
initial modifications to create HFACS-FV. 
2. Identify an appropriate fishing vessel accident data set.  Evaluate HFACS-FV with a 
subset of data of ten cases to confirm that the modified HFACS version adequately 
represents and categorizes investigation information. 
3. Execute the HFACS-FV version, after selecting and training multiple raters, to code 
the entire fishing vessel accident data set. 
4. Evaluate the suitability of the HFACS-FV model through a variety of reliability 
measures in response to Question 1. 
5. Perform quantitative analysis of the output data to identify the most common causal 




















Figure 6: Procedural framework of the study. 
 
4.2 Modify HFACS 
Wiegmann and Shappell’s (2003) HFACS model has been modified and adapted for 
various applications.  Numerous versions have been developed for a specific industry or specific 
accident type, as shown in Table 8.  These model adjustments were meant to provide insight for 
Assess fatal fishing vessel accidents for 























researchers into particular work areas and allow for more relevant data collection and evaluation 
that would produce more direct areas of emphasis to prevent future accidents.  They all offer 
alterations to Wiegmann and Shappell’s (2001) model initially developed for naval aviation 
accidents. 
 
Table 8. Named HFACS variation examples. 
HFACS version Application Developer 
HFACS-ATC Air traffic control accidents Scarborough and Ponds, 2001 
HFACS-ME Helicopter maintenance error Krulak, 2004 
DoD HFACS U.S. Department of Defense mishaps U.S. Department of Defense, 2005 
HFACS-RR Railroad accidents Reinach and Viale, 2006 
HFACS-ADF Australian Defense Force aviation safety 
Australia Government Department of Defense, 
2008 
HFACS-MI Mining accidents Patterson and Shappell, 2010 
HFACS-MSS 
Maritime machinery space fire and 
explosion 
Schröder-Hinrichs et al., 2011 
HFACS-Coll Maritime collisions Chauvin et al., 2013 
HFACS-MA Maritime accidents Chen et al., 2013 
HFACS-Ground Maritime groundings Mazaheri et al., 2015 
HFACS-FCM Maritime fire prevention Soner et al., 2015 
HFACS-
Healthcare 
Surgery-related incidents Cohen et al., 2018 
 
 
The commercial fishing industry offers a challenge where the tiers of organizational 
influence and unsafe supervision can vary substantially due to the size of the company.  That 
does not make these divisions less important but requires thoughtful consideration to address this 
distinction and accurately classify causal factors.  An evaluation of fatal fishing vessel accidents 
in the United States from 1992-2007 concluded that 55% of all deaths were caused by flooding, 
sinking, or capsizing.  Also, most of the deaths occurred while the vessels were transiting either 
from a port or back to port rather than during fishing operations (U.S. Coast Guard, 2008).  
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These statistics indicate that underlying hull integrity issues contributed significantly to these 
fatalities.  These latent factors suggest a lack of maintenance, a failure to adequately monitor 
flooding concerns with the hull and piping systems connected to the hull, or ignoring conditions 
previously identified without completing effective repairs. These conditions also imply of lack of 
financial support from the company.  Except for major corporations involved in the commercial 
fishing industry, the majority of companies have substantially fewer employees with less defined 
organizational procedures and documented policies and procedures.  HFACS-FV, the HFACS 
model customized for fishing vessel accidents, is meant to identify the inherent differences of the 
commercial fishing industry and its workforce with its unique characteristics.   
HFACS-FV addresses hazards specific to commercial fishing.  The National Research 
Council (1991) detailed human factor threats in the industry including: the lack of any 
professional crew certification prior to hiring, the lack of any assessment of physical well-being 
prior to hiring, the lack of professional standards for operating the vessel and fishing gear, the 
absence of human factors consideration in the design and operation of the vessel and fishing 
apparatus, the lack of standardized safety systems, the nearly constant dangers associated with 
vessel and fishing operations, excessive work hours in all weather and sea conditions, and the 
enormous economic pressures that drive daily operations.  These threats are reflected in 
modifications to several HFACS categories and subcategories.  Changes within HFACS-FV 
were made in the following headings: equipment acquisition and support, safety culture, 
risk/systems management, technical readiness of the crew, allowing unsafe operations, mental 
readiness, and physical readiness. 
Equipment acquisition and support is a subcategory under the operational influences tier.  
As previously discussed, organizations within the commercial fishing industry vary considerably.  
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Commercial fishing organizations are generally smaller and more compressed in their structure 
than other transportation or industrial applications.  This means that multiple organization 
responsibilities may be assigned to one person.  In a small organization, where economic 
pressures may not be able to be spread to other vessels, resources, or assets, the decision to 
support new vessels or new equipment or scheduled maintenance represents substantial financial 
expenditures that must be weighed against the likelihood that hazards or delayed operations 
would be encountered.  The reliability of a fishing boat to transit to and from the fishing grounds 
and effectively harvest fish is paramount to any fishing organization.  The recognition of a 
preventative maintenance schedule acknowledges the time and money spent before an accident 
or mishap occurs ensures a safer vessel with minimal operational delays (Marine Accident 
Investigation Branch, 2008).  It also helps to provide an opportunity to address modifications that 
can result in dangerous loading conditions (National Research Council, 1991).  These 
maintenance priorities also must address the life cycle of the vessel or its equipment to determine 
when it is no longer economically feasible to support and when replacement is necessary.  
Safety culture is another subcategory in HFACS-FV under the organizational influences 
tier.  Essentially, robust or effective safety culture is how management prioritizes safety in 
comparison to operations and economic influences (Jaleel and Grewal, 2017; Marine Accident 
Investigation Branch, 2008).  The attitudes of management, either communicated directly or 
understood indirectly, reveal their expectations, and are interpreted by the workers by how they 
perform their jobs. Marine Accident Investigation Branch (2008) has documented that 
management’s positive concerns for the safety of their crews result in more responsible 
operations and actions. This is necessary since many fishing industry personnel are generally not 
supported with health insurance, work hour monitoring, or onboard medical assistance except in 
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life-threatening situations (National Research Council, 1991).  Håvold (2010) noted that 
commitment to a positive safety culture by management can be observed by the orientation that 
new crew members receive detailing the company’s values. 
The subcategory of risk/systems management, also under the organizational influence 
tier, refers to the establishment of management procedures in the same manner that operational 
procedures exist.  It is the recognition that risks must be acknowledged and minimized before 
they impact productivity and profit.  Marine Accident Investigation Branch (2008) observed the 
considerable effect that financial matters had on commercial fishing, and management’s 
commitment to safety offered long term benefits as opposed to unplanned and preventable 
mechanical failures and injuries.  Håvold (2010) proposed that the contentment of commercial 
fishing personnel produced a higher standard of job performance and ultimately led to safer 
operations.  Further, Håvold (2010) wrote that the most important influence on a safety 
management plan is the attitude that management portrayed with respect to safety.  Marine 
Accident Investigation Branch (2008) also pointed out that although many fishing personnel 
demonstrated the ability to perform risk evaluations in the course of their daily operations, there 
was room for improvement in documenting these risk processes in the form of a risk or safety 
management plan. 
The technical readiness of the crew is a subcategory of the unsafe management tier.  This 
is an important factor in the commercial fishing industry since there are no established standards 
for professional competency related to the safe operation and navigation of vessels (National 
Research Council, 1991).  Also, due to smaller-scale operations than other maritime 
transportation segments, crewmembers are expected to be skilled in a variety of professions 
besides vessel and fishing operations, including engine mechanic, electronics expert, hull repair 
54 
 
technician, and safety equipment specialist (National Research Council, 1991).  However, the 
rate of crew turnover can be high depending on the fishery, and this has a negative effect on 
safety (Håvold, 2010).  Jaleel and Grewal (2017) wrote that unsafe operations during ordinary 
and emergency situations on commercial fishing operations are negatively impacted by the 
crew’s lack of training. 
Improper operational risk assessment is a category in the unsafe management tier.  While 
this category is related to risk/systems management, improper operational risk assessment refers 
to the inability of management to provide meaningful and appropriate oversight of expected 
operations with an analysis of the risks that are present rather than having an effective system to 
manage risks.  Håvold (2010) and Zytoon and Basahel (2017) provide statistics from the 
commercial fishing industry that demonstrate the high injury rate of younger workers in the 
industry as opposed to older workers who have more experience, more patience, more skill, and 
are better able to estimate risks during operations.  Marine Accident Investigation Branch (2008) 
stated that the risk-taking environments onboard fishing vessels could be self-perpetuating until 
an accident occurs, which causes the management of this behavior to be corrected.  Improper 
operational risk assessment may also be identified during times of financial hardship when 
vessels and crews are pushed harder and longer regardless of the weather and sea conditions or 
the productivity of the fishery (Marine Accident Investigation Branch, 2008). 
The category of allowing unsafe operations under the unsafe management tier is similar 
to the term “failure to correct known problems” in other HFACS variations.  It can involve 
sending a boat to sea that is not structurally sufficient for the sea conditions it is likely to 
encounter or that the boat's ability to pump its bilges and prevent dangerous accumulations of 
seawater within the hull and possible loss of stability.  Where "allowing unsafe operations" 
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differs, though, may be seen when modifications to the boat are conducted without a complete 
evaluation of their impact on the stability characteristics of the boat.  Structures that are added 
high on the boat or other changes that increase the center of gravity of the boat may be 
overlooked or minimized because of the expense or time delays that may result (Marine Accident 
Investigation Branch, 2008). 
HFACS-FV utilizes the categories of mental readiness and physical readiness under the 
tier of preconditions for unsafe acts to describe how these crew conditions may contribute to 
commercial fishing accidents.   Zytoon and Basahel (2017) commented on the importance of the 
physical readiness of fishing personnel due to hazardous weather conditions combined with 
rotating and moving deck machinery and lifting heavy loads.  Fatigue among workers in the 
commercial fishing industry is routinely documented and frequently cited as a significant factor 
in many accidents (Jaleel and Grewal, 2017).  Work periods of up to 96 hours were documented 
by the National Research Council (1991).  Another major issue of concern affecting the crew's 
condition is stress.  Steiner (1987) noted stress in the commercial fishing industry could be 
caused by work conditions, lack of sleep, or the uncertainty of the catch, and resulting income 
could cause distractions that could lead to accidents.  These are just a few of the many conditions 
that represent the importance of the physical and mental readiness of fishing industry personnel.  
The subcategory of physical/mental limitations in HFACS is included in the HFACS-FV 
subcategories of mental and physical readiness.  This does not infer the unsuitability of this 
former subcategory in the original model, but it is meant to simplify the mental and physical 
readiness subcategories where raters may find it difficult to differentiate between an adverse 










Human resources: Staffing, support, and administration of personnel 
 Equipment acquisition and support: Procurement of new vessels and equipment and 
maintenance of existing vessels and equipment 
Climate Structure: Established leadership and authority and the expected communications of 
managers 
 Safety culture: Relative priority of employee safety expressed by management 
through documentation or actions compared to other organizational priorities 
Process Procedures: Defined objectives, methods, and/or policies for personnel and 
operational matters 
 Risk/systems management: Formalized method to consistently evaluate how risks and 
quality are assessed 
Unsafe Supervision  
Poor supervision Technical readiness of the crew: Strategies, practices, and assessments of crew 
training to ensure their readiness for daily and emergent operations 




Appraisal of current and projected vessel, crew, environmental and fishing 
conditions, and operational limitations 
Allowing unsafe 
operations 
Authorization to commence or continue operations despite full awareness of vessel, 
personnel, or equipment issues present or likely to develop which would endanger the 
vessel or crew 
Supervisory 
violations 
Intentional non-compliance of management overseeing operation with applicable 






Physical environment: Natural and atmospheric conditions and their impact on the 
operator 
 Technological environment: Design, installation, and function of equipment and its 
interaction with operators 
Crew condition Mental readiness: A temporary or permanent psychological or intellectual disability 
or condition that influences a crew members' execution of duties 
 Physical readiness: A temporary or permanent medical or physical disability or 
condition that influences a crew members' execution of duties 
Personnel factors Crew communication: Ineffective interactions between crew members and their 
impact on operations 
 Personal readiness: Lack of preparedness for operation due to inattention to standard 
off-duty protocol 
Unsafe acts  
Errors Skill-based errors: Faulty actions based on inattention to a process or technique 
 Decision errors: Intentional actions inappropriate for the situation due to poor choices 
 Perceptual errors: Improper actions based on defective sensory input and evaluation 
Violations Routine: Deliberate actions that may be common practice and viewed as relatively 
minor but are against standard procedures 





 Table 10 is a comparison of different models comparing tiers, categories, and subcategories.  
Tiers are noted in bold font, categories are in normal font, and subcategories are in italics.  The 
progression of HFACS variations is observed including the motivation for HFACS in Reason 
(1990), the HFACS version created for naval aviation mishaps in Wiegmann and Shappell 
(2003), the Department of Defense (2005) HFACS model for all accident types, the Schröder-
Hinrichs et al. (2011) HFACS-MSS adaptation for shipboard machinery space fires, and the 
model of Yildirum et al. (2017) HFACS-MA proposed for all types of maritime accidents.  The 
table shows the stability of the original models of Reason (1990) and Wiegmann and Shappell 
(2003) especially in the tier of unsafe acts which is relatively unchanged across all of these 
models.  
4.3 Identify fishing vessel fatality data 
Data for this study was collected from the U.S. Coast Guard's Marine Information for 
Safety and Law Enforcement (MISLE) database.  The focus will be on significant accidents 
classified by the Coast Guard as serious marine incidents involving commercial fishing vessels.  
The regulatory term “serious marine incident” is defined in Title 46 Code of Federal Regulations 
§ 4.03-2.  It represents a higher degree of severity from the general term of “marine casualty or 
accident” and includes accidents that result in at least one fatality, injuries requiring medical 
treatment, property damage more than $200,000, the loss of a vessel, and the discharge of more 
than 10,000 gallons of oil or an equivalent amount of hazardous materials.  Agency procedures 
require drug and alcohol testing of all individuals involved in the accident and causal factor 
analysis to be completed as part of the investigation.  This level of accident investigation will 
ensure that the data available to determine causal factors were thoroughly examined and 
documented.  All personal identifying information is eliminated before analysis.  The data for 
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this study will analyze all commercial fishing vessel accidents in the United States for the ten 
year period 2008-2017.  A total of 577 incidents were identified in this query.  Of those, 117 
incidents resulted in one or more fatalities.  These are the incidents that will be considered for 
this study using HFACS-FV.  Data fields from the investigations identify vessel details, 
geographic locations, incident timeline, personnel injuries or fatalities, vessel impact (fire, 
grounding, flooding, sinking), and accident analysis.  Data fields are also provided for narrative 
descriptions of the accident and the accident causes.  All investigations were completed by 
personnel designated under agency procedures and guidelines.  The database and the 
investigation did not identify the accident causes with the standard HFACS tiers, categories, and  
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subcategories.  Therefore, the information that will be analyzed will come directly from the 
database and will be assessed by four reviewers for HFACS-FV conversion.  The dependent 
variables are represented by the consequences of the accidents in the database.  The independent 
variables will consider the accident causes. 
4.4 Implement HFACS-FV 
 After the suitability of the HFACS-FV model has been confirmed through a small data 
set evaluation, it can be used to identify the causal factors of the full data set of fishing vessel 
accidents.  All classification efforts will be based on the database; no attempts will be made by 
the co-raters or the researcher to introduce outside information for consideration in coding or to 
alter conclusions of the investigation.  After the data is categorized, it will be assessed for inter-
rater reliability.  Following that, the data will be evaluated statistically for trends and 
distributions. 
 The actual coding will be conducted independently by four raters.  A discussion 
regarding the number of raters in various HFACS research is presented in the following section.  
The raters will be chosen based on their previous experience with investigating marine accidents 
as well as their experience inspecting and examining commercial vessels.  The raters will be 
trained by the author in the theory and application of HFACS.  In addition, several test cases will 
be used from the data set during the training of the raters as examples in the rating process and 
also to provide sufficient familiarization with HFACS-FV prior to rating the remaining data set.  
The raters will each be given a copy of the database extracts for each fatal incident and a form, as 
shown in Figure 7, that will allow the entry of a "0" if the causal factor was absent from the 
investigation or a "1" if the causal factor was present in the investigation.  The co-raters will be 
evaluating the causal factors for the applicable HFACS tiers and categories or subcategories.  A  
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 HFACS-FV rating sheet    
Rater Number:_____________ Incident number:_____________  
     
Data quality:      1 – Very poor    2  - Poor    3 – Fair     4 – Good      5 - Excellent      
     
Tier Category Rating Notes  
Organizational influences        
  Resource Management      
          Human Resources      
          Equipment Acquisition/Support      
  Climate      
          Structure      
          Safety Culture      
  Process      
          Procedures      
          Risk/Systems Management      
Unsafe Management        
  Poor Supervision      
          Technical Readiness of Crew      
          Supervisory Competency      
  Improper Operational Risk Management       
  Allowing Unsafe Operations      
  Supervisory Violations       
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts        
  Environmental Factors      
          Physical Environment      
          Technological Environment      
  Crew Condition      
          Mental Readiness      
          Physical Readiness      
  Personnel Factors      
          Crew Resource Management      
          Personal Readiness      
Unsafe Acts        
  Errors      
          Skill-based Errors      
          Decision Errors      
          Perceptual Errors      
 Violation      
          Routine      
          Exceptional      
Figure 7: Sample HFACS-FV rating sheet.  
 
 particular causal factor will only be marked in a positive manner, as a “1”, a maximum of one 
time per incident.  In addition to the review of each incident for relevant HFACS causal factors, 
each incident will also be evaluated for the investigation information provided to the reviewers.  
A five-point Likert scale will be utilized to examine the HFACS causal factor rating, given the 
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information available to make those decisions.  The Likert scale will be "1" for very poor, "2" for 
poor, "3" for fair, "4" for good, "5" for excellent.  The concern is that specific incident 
investigations provide more information than others and may provide a higher level of 
confidence in the HFACS rating.  For general comparison, a “1” on this scale will indicate that 
the information available is insufficient to make decisions for causal factors.  A “3” will indicate 
that the information was sufficient to make rating decisions of casual factors and a “5” will 
indicate exceptional information quality.  The most common reasons that may affect information 
availability may be related to the thoroughness of the investigation and entry into the database, 
an extreme lack of evidence when a boat disappears with no survivors or witnesses, or a 
particularly notable incident with multiple fatalities which may allow for additional investigation 
resources, support, and analysis.  This measure of information quality will be valuable to 
compare with inter-rater reliability of the reviewers.  This data will be used to determine the 
relationship between investigation and information quality compared to co-rater reliability. 
Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) describe the beginning of their analysis procedure to be 
the time of the accident with the actions of the operator.  If unsafe acts of the operator were 
determined to contribute to the accident, the raters would examine the categories of errors and 
violations to determine if they were factors in the accident.  The next step would be to consider 
the sub-categories, including skill-based error, decision error, perception error, routine 
violations, and exceptional violations.  After that, the raters would proceed through the tiers of 
preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe management, and organizational influences.  At each tier, 
the rater would assess any potential causal factors and then proceed through each category and 
subcategory, fully evaluating the contributing causal factors.  
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Olsen and Shorrock (2010) showed that co-rater reliability proved to be a concern 
because of the lack of an applied familiarity with HFACS.  Co-raters involved with this study 
have a suitable background and capability to apply the HFACS categorization properly.  Co-
raters will be provided with specialized instruction on the theory and application of HFACS. In 
order to ensure each accident is assessed correctly and consistently, it will be essential to have 
co-raters who have experience and qualifications reach a consensus on these factors or to 
document any disagreement (Shoufan and Damiani, 2017). 
 Cohen et al. (2018) highlight the importance of providing training for co-raters.  Hallgren 
(2012) confirmed that the more training co-raters receive, the better their reliability, thereby 
producing more robust conclusions.  Studies have shown differences in training regimes from 
two hours to two days.  They are generally a combination of instruction and practice exercises.  
The co-raters who participated in this study have a background in maritime laws and regulations 
and vessel examination.  Also, they have been investigators of maritime accidents who are 
currently teaching courses in maritime accident investigation.  Before evaluating the data for the 
HFACS-FV conversion, the co-raters will receive training.  The training will include lecture-type 
sessions on Reason's human error theory and HFACS development, structure, and applications.  
This will be followed by general HFACS coding principles and practical, interactive, and 
supervised HFACS coding examples. 
4.5 Reliability and validity 
Credible research depends on the fundamental concepts of measurement, reliability, and 
validity.  Carmines and Zeller (1979) discuss these terms and define measurement as the 
"process of linking abstract concepts to empirical indicants” (p. 10).  Reliability is concerned 
with the "repeatability" of the measurement, while validity relates to the accurate representation 
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of the intended measurement.  A simple example is a bathroom scale to enable the user to know 
their weight.  A user expects the scale to read the correct weight whenever they use it.  If the 
scale is always 10 pounds off of the true weight, then statistically, it may be reliable but is not 
valid.  This research is dependent upon co-raters’ ability to accurately and consistently apply the 
HFACS criteria to fatal fishing vessel accident investigations and produce sound conclusions 
regarding the use of HFACS-FV. 
Where physical measurement leaves little room for critical review, provided adequate 
attention is provided to equipment calibration and conventional sources of error, HFACS causal 
factor codification requires subjective interpretations of the data and categories.  Reliability 
estimates are used in a variety of fields of study where data interpretation and the resulting 
statistics necessary for conclusions are utilized in research.  Judges or raters evaluate and convert 
the information of one type and align it with a suitable scale or paradigm.  Rater reliability 
estimates personal evaluations, and coding is consistent and leads to proper conclusions.  Rater 
reliability can be further specified as inter-rater reliability, the agreement between raters, or intra-
rater reliability, agreement by the same rater at different times.  Krippendorff (2004) discusses 
the differences between inter-rater and intra-rater reliability in this manner.  Inter-rater reliability 
was summarized as “reproducibility” and intra-rater reliability was described as “stability.”  
Reproducibility, Krippendorff (2004) concluded, was more powerful and easier to examine than 
stability.  Intra-rater reliability requires additional research time and control measures so that the 
coder does not recall previous scenarios, answers, or decisions.  Inter-rater reliability should 
produce consistent results among a variety of coders who have been provided the same 
information and similar instructions while completing their evaluations separately.     
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Similar to Dekker's (2006) theory of the old view and the new view of human error, 
Deming proposed that 94 percent of problems within an organization are due to the systems or 
processes, and six percent are due to the workers themselves (Boardman, 1994).  Deming, as a 
statistician, recognized that variation was a reality in any company and that managers needed to 
be aware of the sources of the variation and minimize its impact.  Likewise, reliability in 
research is linked to consistency and the obligation to identify and decrease or eliminate those 
aspects leading to undependable data and conclusions.  Among the recurrent errors in the 
evaluation and documentation of inter-rater reliability, Hallgren (2012) included the failure to 
note which method was used, the utilization of an inappropriate method based on the type of data 
and number of raters, and an explanation of the inter-rater reliability estimates concerning the 
study.  
A survey of the literature contained in 28 HFACS related studies regarding reliability 
methods shows a significant disparity.  Nearly half of these studies provide no mention of any 
reliability assessment that was performed after the coders conducted their HFACS conversion.  
This does not presume that an evaluation of the coders’ interpretation was not completed for 
reliability purposes; it merely means that it was not part of the report.  However, it does raise the 
question whether any reliability analysis was completed in conjunction with these studies.  The 
remainder of these 28 studies employed a wide variety of reliability measures including percent 
agreement, Cohen’s kappa, multi-rater kappa free, Krippendorff’s alpha, Cronbach’s alpha, and 
other correlation coefficients.  Table 11 provides an inter-rater reliability summary, as reported 




Table 11. Reported inter-rater reliability in various HFACS studies.  Adapted from Cohen et al. 
(2015). 
Study Number of 
raters 
Reliability Method Reported inter-rater reliability 
Gaur (2005) 2 Percent agreement (PA) PA=87.0% 
Li and Harris (2006) 2 PA and Cohen’s kappa 
(k) 
PAaverage=88.8%, kaverage=0.67 
Li et al. (2008) 2 PA and k PAaverage=85.1%, kaverage=0.38 
O’Connor (2008) 123 PA PA fixedaverage=77.8%, PA 
rotaryaverage=78.8% 
Baysari et al. (2009) 3 PA PAaverage=79.0% 
Rashid et al. (2010) 2 PA and k PAaverage=94.8%, kaverage=0.77 
O’Connor (2010) 2 Multi-rater kappa free 
(kfree) 
kfree(average)=0.76 
Olson and Shorrock 
(2010) 
Study 1- 11, 
Study 2- 1 
PA Study 1- PA=40.0% 
Study 2- PA=40.1% 
O’Connor and Walker 
(2011) 
204 kfree kfree helicopter=0.58, kfree tacair=0.69 
Olson (2011) 7 PA PAATCO=36.1%, PAHF=34.5% 
Zhou et a. (2013) Not reported Cronbach’s alpha (CA) CA=0.92 
Madigan et al. (2016) 2 PA PAaverage=91.2% 
Ergai (2016) 125 Krippendorff alpha (KA) KAaverage=0.67 
 
 
Percent agreement is an intuitive measure for two raters that can easily compare their 
number of agreements and disagreements as a percentage from zero to 100.  This method 
presents the specific categories being rated that show disagreement (McHugh, 2012) and is 
frequently used in research projects (Hallgren, 2012).  Cohen et al. (2015) observed that percent 
agreement is more reliable as the number of items to be rated increases and is less reliable as the 
possible categories for the rater increases.  The primary concern for percent agreement arises 
from those agreements that happen where the raters come to the same decision randomly 
(Hallgren, 2012).  This is mainly an issue with a small number of categories.  Krippendorff 
(2011) argues that percent agreement is only usable for two coders and infers inaccurate 
conclusions for very low and very high percent agreement.  Hayes and Krippendorff (2007) 
stated that the percent agreement is "flawed in nearly all important respects” (p. 80).  Wallace 
and Ross (2006) considered 70% agreement as a minimum figure to determine rater reliability. 
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Scott (1955) and Cohen (1960) presented methods that considered the chance agreement 
in their studies.  Cohen (1960) referred to his measure as the "coefficient of agreement," which 
described "the proportion of chance-related disagreements" among the raters and identified it as 





where 𝑝0 is the proportion of agreed ratings and 𝑝𝑐 is the proportion of chance agreed ratings.  
The scale of the kappa statistic ranges from -1 to +1 and is a type of correlation coefficient 
suitable for only two coders (McHugh, 2012).  Primavera et al. (1996) discussed the nine 
commonly used reliability measures at that time and endorsed Cohen’s kappa for the use of two 
raters with nominal data.  Also, Cohen's kappa was noted for its known standard error leading to 
confidence intervals and significance testing of its values.  Although the complexity of 
calculations completed manually could be challenging, Primavera et al. (1996) concluded, "we 
know of no major disadvantages of kappa” (p. 64).  Wiegmann and Shappell (2003) opted to use 
Cohen's kappa as a "conservative” reliability indicator in their research.  Landis and Koch (1977) 
proposed a graduated kappa scale that ranged from less than zero indicating poor reliability to 
values above 0.81 indicating almost perfect reliability. 
However, differing opinions about Cohen’s kappa appear in the literature.  The use of 
percent agreement, under the name index of concordance, was favored over Cohen’s kappa in 
several HFACS studies (Olsen and Shorrock, 2010; Olsen, 2011; Madigan et al., 2016).  They 
substantiate their perspective based on Davies et al. (2003), Ross et al. (2004), and Wallace and 
Ross (2006), which discount Cohen's (1960) point of view on chance agreement with truly 
independent raters.  The index of concordance noted above was attributed to Martin and Bateson 
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(1986) and is represented as A/(A + D), where A is the number, percent, or proportion of rater 
agreements, and D is the number, percent, or proportion of rater disagreements. 
Hallgren (2012) claimed that two adverse results are possible with the use of Cohen's 
kappa.  "Prevalence problems" can occur when raters are more inclined to select various 
categories, which can lead to inaccurate low kappa estimates.  "Bias problems" suggest differing 
category selection distributions that may lead to distorted kappa figures on the high side.  
Krippendorff (2011) concluded, "that kappa's expected agreement is entirely inadequate for 
assessing the reliability of coding” (p. 98). 
Krippendorff’s (1970) alpha is recognized as a flexible and consistent measure of 
reliability.  As Hayes and Krippendorff (2007) explain the agreement coefficient, "…it 
generalizes across scales of measurement; can be used with any number of observers, with or 
without missing data; and it satisfies all of the important criteria for a good measure of 
reliability” (p. 78).  Hayes and Krippendorff (2007) suggested that alpha values higher than 0.8 
demonstrated reliability and values less than 0.667 indicated unreliable agreement.   
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  and  𝜋𝑘 = (𝑝𝑘+ + 𝑝+𝑘)/2 . 
Here 𝑝𝑎
′ is the percent of rater agreement and 𝑝𝑒 is the percent of chance rater agreement.  The 
form of the calculation for Cohen's kappa, Scott's pi, and Krippendorff alpha are very similar, but 
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the method each of them use to estimate the chance agreement of the raters is different (Gwet, 
2014).  Hayes and Krippendorff (2007) state that with two raters with nominal data that "is 
asymptotically equal to Scott’s ” (p. 82). 
This study will utilize percent agreement, Cohen’s kappa, and Krippendorff’s alpha to 
compare inter-rater reliability for the HFACS tiers and categories.  A comparison of the 
reliability estimates will provide a measure of confidence if there is agreement and lack of 
confidence if there is not agreement.  This is similar to the approach of Jacinto et al. (2016) that 
used percent agreement, Scott’s pi, and Krippendorff’s alpha.  Their study examined workplace 
accidents using the European Statistics of Accidents at Work system and employed inter-rater 
and intra-rater reliability among different groups of raters.  Their results showed strong 
agreement with all three measures, although percent agreement was consistently the highest.  
Ergai (2013) applied percent agreement, Cohen's kappa, and Krippendorff's alpha for intra-rater 
reliability and percent agreement, Fleiss' kappa, and Krippendorff's alpha for inter-rater 
reliability.  These measures demonstrated strong consensus within the intra-rater and inter-rater 






5.1 Rater process and observations 
Four raters were selected for converting the data from the Coast Guard accident 
investigations into the HFACS-FV framework.  The raters were experienced in vessel 
examinations and inspections and were very familiar with the various maritime and industry 
standards applicable to commercial vessels.  They also were knowledgeable in maritime accident 
investigation, including the response to investigation scenes.  Before agreeing to participate in 
the HFACS-FV rating of accidents for this research, none of the raters had any familiarity with 
the HFACS model or applying a similar framework to accident investigation.  A total of four 
hours of human factors and HFACS instruction, directed and self-paced examples, and a 
discussion of their ratings of selected accidents conducted individually prepared the raters for 
their independent rating of 73 accidents.  The raters spent significant time in providing ratings 
for this study.  They spent an average of four hours rating the 12 training cases and 12 hours 
rating the remaining 73 investigations.  With limited exposure to human factors principles, the 
interpretation of the various categories and subcategories required additional description to allow 
for a more consistent evaluation by the raters.  Discussions between raters explaining their 
rationale for a decision of one factor as opposed to another factor during the training sessions 
increased mutual understanding of the categories by the raters.  Complicating the rating process 
was the number of cases with smaller organizations that virtually eliminated the major tiers, 
although the categories and subcategories remained valid.  This indicates a significant departure 
from the standard HFACS regime but establishes the HFACS-FV model for applications 
involving small businesses and organizations.  As an example, an investigation can identify 
whether the factor of equipment acquisition and support contributed to the accident. However, as 
71 
 
a subcategory under the organizational tier it may seem an unreasonable selection for a small 
organization with a limited number of employees.  This meant that the raters focused on the 
categories and subcategories and not the major tier under which they were organized. 
           Raters were challenged by limiting their decisions to the conclusions found in the accident 
reports when their subject matter knowledge could easily lead them to infer other factors.  The 
raters were instructed to base their decisions only on the conclusions stated and not make 
deductions based on additional information that may have been presented in the investigation 
report. 
Each of the four raters examined 73 accident investigation reports and used the 
investigation conclusions to convert these findings into the 22 factors of the HFACS-FV 
framework.  All raters worked independently and provided their results directly to the researcher.  
The raters examined the human factors that led to the initiating cause of the accident rather than 
the subsequent actions.  For example, if a fishing boat sank due to a flooding issue and a 
crewmember died after abandoning the boat without wearing a personal flotation device, only the 
conclusions relating to the flooding were considered for the HFACS-FV conversion and not the 
proper use of lifesaving equipment.  This emphasized the event which was most responsible for 
the fatality and helped to clarify expectations for the raters. 
5.2 Data analysis 
           Data was gathered on 117 accidents from their investigation reports.  A review of the raw 
data from these accidents showed that the top five initiating events were capsizing (32 
accidents), flooding (26 accidents), falls overboard (16 accidents), crew injury (15 accidents), 




Figure 8: Locations of all reported fatal fishing vessel accidents involving vessels registered in 
the United States, 2008-2017.  
 
 
Of these 117 accidents, 32 were excluded from the analysis.  The exclusions were comprised of 
26 accidents where all crewmembers aboard died without other witnesses; five accidents where 
the decedent had a diagnosed, pre-existing medical condition; and one accident that was 
improperly categorized as a fishing vessel when it was not. 
           After removing these excluded accidents from consideration, 85 accident investigations 
remained.  These 85 accidents were reviewed to produce a consensus rating and assessed for the 
human factors involved in the accidents, geographic (regional) evaluation of the human factors 
that were present, and accident location in relation to its distance from shore and the human 
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factors that were revealed, the vessel length, and any correlation of these human factors with 
other accidents in similar locations.  These analyses are summarized in Table 15 and will be 
described below.   
The consensus rating was produced from the four raters' assessments into one combined 
rating for each HFACS-FV category.  This rating compared the judgments of the raters and 
required the agreement for each factor by at least three of the raters.  An example of the 
consensus rating process is from incident number 3145673.  Raters one and two identified 
improper operational risk assessment and physical environment as contributing factors.  Rater 
number three concluded that improper operational risk assessment, physical environment, and 
decision error were factors.  Rater number four identified physical environment as a contributing 
factor.  The consensus ratings from this incident were the categories of improper operational risk 
assessment and physical environment.  The results from all of the raters and the consensus 
ratings for all categories of all accidents in this study are provided in Appendix A.  
           These consensus ratings established the human factors for statistical analysis and 
identified 108 human factors present in these 85 accidents for a mean 1.24 factors per accident.  
The top five human factors discerned from the consensus HFACS-FV rating were physical 
environment (20), equipment acquisition and support (18), decision error (13), technical 
readiness of the crew (12), and allowing unsafe operations (9).  The complete consensus rating of 
the HFACS-FV human factors by category is shown in Figure 9.  The list of categories is ordered 
using the standard HFACS arrangement of tiers but without showing those separations.  Thus, 
the categories under the organizational influences are listed first, followed by the categories of 
unsafe management, then the categories for preconditions for unsafe acts, and finally, the 
categories for unsafe acts.  This order also represents how these categories are characterized as 
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latent and active failures.  The distinction between latent and active failures occurs between the 
tiers of preconditions for unsafe acts and unsafe acts.  In Figure 9, this happens between the 
categories of personal readiness and skill-based errors.  The diagram without the tier 
designations depicts actual HFACS-FV application to small organizations which may show 
minor personnel changes between the four tiers.  
 
 
Figure 9: Human factors by categories in consensus HFACS-FV rating of incidents. 
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The data from these 85 accidents were assessed for human factor trends based on the accidents’ 
geographical location and whether the accident occurred on inland, coastal, or offshore waters.  
The six geographic divisions for analysis were the Atlantic Ocean and connecting waters from 
Maine to New Jersey, the Atlantic Ocean and connecting waters from Delaware to Florida, the 
Gulf of Mexico and connecting waters, the Pacific Ocean from Washington to California and 
connecting waters, the waters of Alaska, the Central Pacific Ocean including Hawaii and United 
States territories.  Another analysis was conducted with different geographic groupings.  The 
description of inland waters refers to harbors, rivers, and sounds that minimize exposure to 
adverse weather and sea conditions.  Coastal waters are less protected than inland waters and 
considered bays or inlets at the entrance to or immediately adjacent to oceans or seas.  Offshore 
waters are oceans, seas, and the Gulf of Mexico that maximize the vulnerability of mariners and 
vessels.  Table 12 provides the top human factor categories by these locations. 
The data were also examined for vessels of different lengths.  Length measurements were 
available for 81 out of 85 of these accidents.  The length grouping was for vessels less than 25 
feet long, between 25 and 40 feet long, between 40 and 60 feet long, between 60 and 100 feet 
long, and greater than 100 feet long.  The data are summarized below in Table 13. 
Correlation calculations were performed to determine if statistically significant 
relationships existed between the human factors using IBM SPSS Statistics version 26 (SPSS).  
These calculations were performed for factors identified within these geographic and length 
separations.  The Pearson Chi-Square test showed that the correlation between any of the human 
factors grouped by accident location or boat length was not statistically significant at a p < 0.05.  




Table 12: Top human factors by accident location from consensus ratings. 
Accident location Top human factor categories 
East Coast (north) Decision error 
  Physical environment 
East Coast (south) Physical environment 
  Decision error 
  Equipment acquisition/support 
Gulf Coast Equipment acquisition/support 
  Physical environment 
West Coast Physical environment 
  Decision error 
Alaska Equipment acquisition/support 
  Physical environment 
Pacific Technical readiness of the crew 
  Equipment acquisition/support 
Inland waters Equipment acquisition/support 
  Physical environment 
Coastal waters Physical environment 
  Decision error 
Offshore waters Equipment acquisition/support 
  Allowing unsafe operations 
  Technical readiness of the crew 
            
 
of a statistical relationship between human factors provides insight into the complexity and 
variation of these fatal fishing vessel accidents' underlying causes. 
           From these 85 accidents, twelve were used for the raters' training and familiarity with the 
HFACS-FV model, leaving 73 cases to compute inter-rater reliability.  Calculations for inter-
rater reliability were made using Microsoft Excel 2013 (Excel) and SPSS.  Inter-rater reliability 
was calculated using the methods of percent agreement, the kappa statistic, and Krippendorff’s 
Alpha.  A summary of inter-rater reliability by the incident is displayed in Figure 10. 
The mean percent agreement for all raters of all accidents was calculated as 89.26%.  The 
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calculated to be 0.3367.  The differences between these methods' results were not consistent 
since they were calculated and because only two options were available for the raters; the factor 
was either present or not present.  Since the kappa statistic and the Krippendorff’s alpha consider 
chance or random agreement, this binary choice can significantly differ with the percent 
agreement calculations.  Calculations using percent agreement and the kappa statistic are limited 
to two raters at one time where the Krippendorff’s alpha calculations consider all four raters 
simultaneously.  Accordingly, the reported percent agreement and kappa statistic are the mean of 
six rater comparisons (rater one to rater two, rater two to rater three, rater three to rater four, rater 
one to rater three, rater one to rater four, and rater two to rater four).  A breakdown of the mean 
percent agreement of raters by the human factor category was also performed to determine if 

























































to lower inter-rater reliability values.   The human factor categories with the lowest mean percent 
agreement were decision error, equipment acquisition and support, technical readiness of the 
crew, skill-based error, and procedures.  Figure 11 summarizes the mean percent agreement of 
raters by the human factors category. 
 
 











Mean percent agreement of raters by category
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5.3 Discussion of results 
           This section will interpret the calculated results presented above.  The exclusion of 26 
cases or 22% of all of the 117 total accidents because there were no survivors and no witnesses 
was imposed due to lack of information from which the investigator could reasonably draw 
conclusions regarding the cause of the accident.  Subsequently, the raters' data regarding the 
human factors selected would be suspect as well.  More troubling than excluding these cases is 
the realization that 17 of these accidents involved only a single operator with no additional 
crewmembers.  That means that the same person who is navigating the boat is also setting and 
retrieving the fishing gear and stowing the catch.  It also means that there is no one available to 
help when an injury or fall overboard happens.  In addition, it also means that there is no one to 
assist the operator with meals or when fatigued.  This points to the thin economic margins of the 
business and the risks that these operators are willing to take.        
5.3.1 HFACS-FV results 
           Twelve accidents out of these 85 were utilized for the training of the raters.  The 
researcher chose these accidents for training purposes randomly, but ultimately they included 
straightforward cases, complex cases, cases with numerous human factors present, and those 
with few or no human factors present. Initially, ten cases were chosen for training purposes, but 
two additional cases were provided to increase the raters' confidence.  The consensus rating, as 
noted previously, showed a mean of 1.24 human factors per accident.  This statistic is valuable to 
understand the correlation between human factors and inter-rater reliability discussed later in this 
chapter.  The top five categories of physical environment, equipment acquisition and support, 
decision error, technical readiness of the crew, and allowing unsafe operations account for 72 out 
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of 108 (67%) of the human factors issues noted and provide a solid foundation for the underlying 
causes of these fatal accidents. 
           The physical environment category illuminates the impact of weather and sea conditions 
on the operator and the risks that operators take as part of their routine course of business.  
Equipment acquisition and support as a highly rated human factor indicates that the owner and/or 
operator utilized a boat that had known and unresolved issues related to the vessel or equipment 
before their voyage.  It also indicates the economic constraints under which these businesses 
must operate.  The risk of operating a boat that needed to be replaced or repaired produced 
significant consequences in these accidents.  The identification of decision error as a category on 
this list is not surprising.  An operator's direction to the crew under complex operating conditions 
or response to an accident scenario can understandably result in a regrettable decision.  
Furthermore, given the tendency to place responsibility for an accident on the operator, this 
active factor shows the complexity and dynamics of the business operations.  The technical 
readiness of the crew resulting in fatalities refers to the training of the crew so that they are ready 
to respond to routine and emergent conditions.  Although many fishing vessel operators have 
years of experience, their crews may be quite inexperienced.  Also, without any licensing or 
professional certification requirements, it is difficult to attribute any minimum level of 
competence to the operators or crews.  Further, issues such as vessel loading and stability may 
not be fully understood or assessed by the crew.  Allowing unsafe operations indicates personnel 
were allowed to begin or continue operations with the full awareness of the dangers involved.  
This human factor has interesting parallels to the technical readiness of the crew.  Both factors 
are considered to be supervisory, but the factor of allowing unsafe operations shows the bias in 
taking risks in dangerous situations.  These five categories from fatality cases demonstrate how 
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commercial fishing personnel have substantial economic constraints, are inclined to take risks, 
and would benefit from additional training.            
The geographic distribution of accidents from the locations in Figure 8 indicates that 34% 
of these accidents occurred on the East Coast, 16% on the Gulf Coast, 19% on the West Coast, 
17% in Alaska, and 13% in the Central Pacific Ocean.  Without detailed data in each geographic 
area on the number of vessels engaged in fisheries, economic factors including market demand, 
cost to operate and repair vessels, crew availability and training, weather and sea conditions, and 
various other matters, it would be challenging to compare each region against the others for the 
rate of fatal accidents.  For reference, Table 14 shows the top ten ports for fishery landings by 
value and quantity of their catch for 2015.  While there are several ports on both lists, the ports 
on one list but not the other show the complexity of making any type of accident rate 
comparison; therefore, no insights or conclusions will be provided based solely on accident 
location.  
 
Table 14: Top ports for fishery landings in the United States for 2015 (U.S. Department of 
      Commerce, 2016). 
Port Value Port Quantity 
 (Million dollars)  (Million pounds) 
New Bedford, MA 322 Dutch Harbor, AK 787 
Dutch Harbor, AK 218 Kodiak, AK 514 
Kodiak, AK 138 Aleutian Islands, AK 467 
Aleutian Islands, AK 111 Intracoastal City, LA 428 
Empire-Venice, LA 111 Empire-Venice, LA 379 
Honolulu, HI 97 Reedville, VA 350 
Alaskan Peninsula, AK 90 Pascagoula-Moss Point, MS 295 
Bristol Bay, AK 90 Alaskan Peninsula, AK 268 
Cape May-Wildwood, NJ 72 Naknek, AK 176 




           The next portion of the analysis consisted of grouping these consensus ratings for 85 
accidents geographically.  The first grouping was based on the part of the country where the 
accident happened.  The objective was to see if specific parts of the country may have similar 
vessels, fisheries, attitudes towards safety, attitudes towards risk, and other matters and their 
impact on fatal accidents.  The number of accidents in this study on the East Coast from New 
Jersey through Maine was 12.  The number on the East Coast from Delaware through Florida 
was 13.  The number on the Gulf Coast was 15.  There were 18 accidents on the West Coast 
from California to Washington, 18 accidents in Alaskan waters, and nine accidents in the Central 
Pacific Ocean.  The top categories for human factor selection for all of these locations included 
physical environment for every location except the Central Pacific Ocean.  Perhaps voyages in 
the Central Pacific Ocean led these operators to consider longer-term weather predictions or to 
ensure the vessel's condition was ready for these remote operating conditions.  Decision error 
and equipment acquisition and support were also widely represented in most geographic 
groupings.  The Central Pacific Ocean accidents showed that technical readiness of the crew was 
a significant human factor.  This may be attributed to hiring crewmembers of multiple 
nationalities and languages.  
           Operations on inland, coastal and offshore waters indicate the time the boats will be 
underway until their return.  The consensus ratings showed 21 of these accidents occurred on 
inland waters, 38 accidents happened on coastal waters, and 26 accidents on offshore waters.  
Boats on inland waters generally return the same day, boats on coastal waters return typically 
within days, and boats on offshore waters may be away from their homeport for weeks.  This 
helps to explain how physical environment was not one of the leading human factor categories 
associated with accidents on offshore waters.  Vessels operating on offshore waters, in all 
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probability, are built to a higher standard and maintained better to withstand sustained operation 
in the expected weather and sea conditions.  Represented in the category selection of the top 
human factors for accidents occurring on offshore waters includes allowing unsafe operations 
and the technical readiness of the crew.  These two factors can be explained by the length of their 
voyage and the fatigue that is likely to develop and magnify any primary training deficit. 
           The length of fishing vessels covered in this accident data varied from 17' to 344', with 
most of the vessels measuring less than 60' in length.  Capsizing was the leading initiating event 
in the length groupings less than 60' long.  Examining the primary initiating event with the top 
human factor categories, one can theorize that these vessels were operating beyond the design 
limitations of their vessel for the specific weather conditions, possibly with unsafe loading that 
created stability issues on their vessels.  Flooding is another commonly seen initiating event that 
indicates the economic concerns faced by this industry that lead to delaying hull maintenance or 
repairs and the tendency to embrace risk during operations.  For vessel groupings of 60' or more, 
one can see the transition from capsizing to fatal crewmember injuries.  This is not unexpected as 
these larger vessels have more crewmembers and significant mechanical equipment to handle 
and transfer their large volume of fish.  The top human factors also support this accident 
causation by identifying training, procedures, and equipment issues.  As one would expect, the 
primary operating waters show the smaller vessels operate on more protected waters and the 
larger vessels on less sheltered waters.    
           Correlation calculations were performed for all factors of accidents within the same 
geographic and length groupings.  With a consensus mean human factor selection of 1.24 factors 
per accident, it is not surprising that no statistically significant correlations were found to 
indicate relationships between these human factor categories. 
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Table 15: Summary of completed analyses. 
Relationship Reference Finding Interpretation 
Human factors 
by categories 
of all incidents 
Figure 9 Top factors were physical environment, 
equipment acquisition and support, 
decision error, technical readiness of the 
crew, and allowing unsafe operations. 
Risk-taking related to business 
profitability and associated with 
weather or sea conditions, economic 
factors affecting vessel readiness, and 





Table 12 Physical environment was the top 
human factor for all locations except the 
Central Pacific Ocean and offshore 
waters where equipment acquisition and 
support and technical readiness of the 
crew were the top human factors. 
Vessel operations close to shore and 
economic pressures may cause 






Table 13 Physical environment was the top 
human factor for all vessels of less than 
60' in length and equipment acquisition 
and support was the top human factor 
for vessels more than 60' in length. 
Smaller vessels that operate closer to 
shore are willing to take more risk 
considering their relatively short time to 
return to their homeport. 
 
 
5.3.2 Rater reliability results 
           As previously discussed, calculations were completed for percent agreement, Cohen’s 
kappa, and Krippendorff’s alpha.  Calculations were initially conducted with Excel.  Then 
calculations were performed with SPSS for percent agreement, the kappa statistic, and 
Krippendorff’s alpha.  Krippendorff’s alpha statistic was not directly available in SPSS and 
required the separate Krippendorff’s alpha macro to be imported into SPSS for the calculation 
(Hayes and Krippendorff, 2007; Griffin).  Table 16 shows pertinent characteristics for each of 
these inter-rater reliability measures.  As addressed in Section 4.5, there is considerable academic 
discussion associated with inter-rater reliability methods, including their positive and negative 
aspects and researchers' preferences.  Results for this study produced a mean percent agreement 
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of 89.26% which indicates reliable agreement, a mean kappa statistic of 0.3966 shows a fair to 
moderate reliability, and a Krippendorff's alpha of 0.3367 indicates unreliable agreement. 
 
Table 16: Comparison of inter-rater reliability methods used in this study (Landis and Koch, 











Percent agreement 2 0 to 100% 0 – 60%  unreliable 
60 – 70%  moderately reliable 
70 – 100%  reliable 
89.26% 
Cohen’s kappa 2 -1 to 1 <0  unreliable 
0 – 0.20 slight reliability 
0.21 – 0.40  fair reliability 
0.41 – 0.60  moderate reliability 
0.61 – 0.80  substantial reliability 
0.81 – 1.00  almost perfect 
0.3966 
Krippendorff’s alpha 2 or more 0 to 1 0 – 0.667  unreliable 
0.667 – 0.80  acceptable reliability 




With these statistics providing conflicting impressions of the reliability of HFACS-FV, 
further examination is necessary.  Ideally, the results of each of these inter-rater reliability 
methods would demonstrate reliable agreement.  Olsen and Shorrock (2010) explored the 
challenges of inter-rater reliability with the HFACS framework.  Issues such as the selection of 
rating participants from field experts rather than human factors experts, unclear or overlapping 
category descriptions that produce various interpretations and assessments by the raters, and the 
usage of inter-rater reliability statistics are a few of these issues.  As previously noted, a 
significant portion of HFACS studies do not report reliability statistics.  From the reliability 
analysis perspective, there are two major obstacles for the type of data provided by the raters.  
The data was widely characterized by 22 human factors that the raters showed were not present 
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in the vast majority of the accidents.  Also, the raters had two choices for each factor: present or 
not.  Both of these challenges were noted by Kraemer et al. (2002): 
It is useful to note that κ = 0 indicates either that the heterogeneity of the patients in the 
population is not well detected by the raters or ratings, or that the patients in the 
population are homogeneous.  Consequently, it is well known that it is very difficult to 
achieve high reliability of any measure (binary or not) in a very homogeneous population 
(P near 0 or 1 for binary measures).  That is not a flaw in kappa or any other measure of 
reliability, or a paradox.  It merely reflects the fact that it is difficult to make clear 
distinctions between the patients in a population in which those distinctions are very rare 
or fine.  In such populations, ‘noise’ quickly overwhelms the ‘signals’ (p. 2114). 
Another interesting characteristic of kappa calculations occurs when one or more raters select the 
same rating for each category, which results in a κ = 0, as noted above.  SPSS would not perform 
a kappa calculation in these instances.  Consider the following kappa configuration from sample 
data obtained from this study in Figure 12. 
 
 0 1  
0 20 0 20 
1 2 0 2 
 22 0 22 




This shows the rater represented as the top of the figure selected “0” 20 times and “1” 0 times, 
while the rater represented at the left of the figure selected “0” 20 times and “1” 2 times.  In 
other words, the first rater did not show that any of the 22 factors were present in the accident.  
Recalling Cohen’s kappa equation, the kappa is calculated as: 
κ = (((20/22)+0) – ((20/22)*1)+(0*(20/22)))/(1 – (20/22)) = 0. 
Thus, although the percent agreement was 20/22 or 0.909, kappa was not reported for these two 
raters.  Accordingly, Figure 10 does not show mean kappa for those accidents. 
           A sample of SPSS calculation output is provided in Appendix B.  Output files for incident 
numbers 4709987 and 5940972 show the calculations for the six rating pairs for percent 
agreement, the kappa statistic, and the Krippendorff’s alpha statistic.  These output files highlight 
the sensitivity of the kappa and Krippendorff’s alpha statistics to minor rating differences.  A 
general observation with these two rating outputs reveals that a slightly reduced mean percent 
agreement from 90.17% for incident number 4709987 to 87.88% for incident number 5940972 
resulted in dramatic increases to the kappa statistic from 0.0618 to 0.5558 and Krippendorff’s 
alpha from 0.0916 to 0.5521, respectively. 
           The data shows a degree of confusion of raters for critical factors.  Certain factors showed 
interpretation differences that reduced inter-rater reliability.  An analysis of the human factor 
categories with the lowest mean percent agreement by raters showed decision error, equipment 
acquisition and support, technical readiness of the crew, and skill-based error. Further, 
procedures were the most likely to produce disagreements among raters.  A review of raters’ 
scoring sheets indicated inconsistent interpretation between the factors of decision error and 
skill-based error.  While skill-based error relates to improper actions based on inattention to a 
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process or a technique, decision error addresses intentional acts due to poor decisions.  Both of 
the errors possess cognitive and action components, and the data shows that raters appeared to 
have different understandings of these factors.  A mean percent agreement between raters of less 
than 80% for decision error most likely negatively impacted inter-rater reliability, especially 
since it was one of the leading consensus human factors.  A similar concern exists for equipment 
acquisition and support as the second leading human factor category.  While it is less clear from 
the data what may have caused the lack of agreement, this factor was also likely for reduced 
inter-rater reliability. 
Overall, the inter-rater reliability shows the need for HFACS-FV method improvements 
to allow conclusive levels of reliability using the percent agreement, Cohen's kappa, and 





CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The goal of this work was to establish HFACS-FV as an appropriate model to classify the causal 
factors that contribute to fishing vessel accidents.  The collected data were analyzed for patterns 
or trends to determine human factors causes in fishing vessel accidents and evaluated to 
determine whether mitigations can be proposed to prevent future accidents.  Overall, although 
the HFACS-FV variation shows significant potential, the results from this study produced 
marginal reliability and indicate additional modifications are necessary. 
6.1 Support for research questions 
           In Chapter 1, several research questions were identified as objectives in this study.  They 
are revisited below using the results and the analysis of this research. 
     Question 1:  Is HFACS an appropriate tool for analyzing accidents caused by human 
factors in the commercial fishing industry? 
The first research question was concerned with a discernable pattern or distribution of the 
human factor categories from the data.  The consensus ratings clearly showed the leading 
categories: physical environment, equipment acquisition and support, decision error, technical 
readiness of the crew, and allowing unsafe operations.  These categories indicate opportunities to 
reduce accidents that exist with enhanced risk assessment, additional funding for the 




Question 2:  Does the use of the HFACS framework identify any pattern or consistent 
distribution of the various human factor categories that contribute to commercial fishing vessel 
accidents in the United States? 
Question 3:  Does the data suggest that organizational factors have less impact on 
commercial fishing vessel accidents in the United States than supervisory or non-supervisory 
issues?  
Question 4:  Does the data suggest that latent conditions have less impact on commercial 
fishing vessel accidents in the United States than active conditions? 
           Questions two, three, and four are similar in that they attempt to ascertain the distribution 
of human factors in the consensus rating across the various HFACS tiers of organization, 
supervisory, preconditions, and unsafe actions by the operator and the degree to which they 
represent latent or active failures.  In general, the data in Figure 9 shows a reasonable distribution 
across the tiers with unsafe acts as the tier least represented.  The tiers of supervisory factors and 
preconditions are equally represented with the next highest tiers of consensus human factor 
ratings, followed by the organizational tier.  The division of the human factors by tiers is 
provided in Table 17. 
 
Table 17: Summary of human factors by HFACS-FV tier. 
HFACS-FV tier Total number of human factors from consensus ratings 
Organizational influences 30 
Unsafe management 27 
Preconditions for unsafe acts 30 




Considering the small business nature of the fishing industry, in general, one of the valuable 
points of this study is that the HFACS tiers are not nearly as important as the HFACS categories 
and subcategories.  This is due to compression of the tiers that realistically eliminates one or 
more tiers.  This also highlights latent and active failures in these accidents.  The data 
overwhelmingly shows latent factors had a much more significant role in these accidents than 
active failures.  
Question 5:  Is there any relationship to reliability estimates for identified human factors 
and the quality of the information provided in the investigation? 
           The fifth question primarily concerns the degree to which the rater found the investigation 
to benefit their review for human factors selection.  The data showed no relationship to the 
investigation report to the reliability that was produced.  There was a general trend indicating 
that the investigations were more complete and more valuable to the raters as the length of the 
fishing vessel increased or the number of fatalities increased.  It seems logical that there would 
be more scrutiny on the investigation report with more people impacted. 
6.2 Conclusions 
           The HFACS-FV method presented in this study was shown to provide valuable 
information regarding the human factors involved in fatal fishing vessel accidents.  Identifying 
the human factor categories of physical environment, equipment acquisition and support, 
decision error, technical readiness of the crew, and allowing unsafe operations in the consensus 
rating provide realistic opportunities for the improvement of safety throughout commercial 
fishing fleets.  The inter-rater reliability measures did not indicate overall method reliability 
using percent agreement, Cohen's kappa, and Krippendorff’s alpha statistics.  However, with 
method refinements and enhanced category descriptions, a modified HFACS-FV structure could 
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produce sound inter-rater reliability statistics not only for fishing vessels but also provide a 
generalized tool to analyze accidents occurring in smaller organizations in the transportation and 
industrial sectors. 
6.3 Future study 
           The process and knowledge obtained from this study provide significant potential for 
subsequent inquiry in the examination of human error.  An analysis of the categories that are 
utilized and further clarification of their interpretation would be beneficial to any future 
adaptations and their raters.  Also, consideration should be given to modifying the rating choices 
so that a Likert scale on the presence of a factor is available to the raters.  Although this would 
complicate the rating process, it would provide a better idea of the influence of particular human 
factors and likely produce more consistent inter-rater reliability calculations. 
Small businesses involved in transportation, construction, or other industries that have to 
balance several concerns, including maintaining a profitable and successful company with a safe 
workforce, face significant challenges with a smaller workforce.  Their concerns, constraints, 
business models, and organizational structures differ from those of larger or multi-national 
corporations. A logical expectation that follows is that the accident analysis for these businesses 
would differ as well.  In addition to commercial fishing vessels, small companies in the maritime 
industry include excursion passenger, charter boat, and towing services.  In air transportation and 
trucking, there are also small businesses in the midst of large companies.  This HFACS-FV 
model could be adapted to these industries and their regulators to examine the human factors 
involved in their accidents so that they could operate more safely and prevent injuries to 
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Rater 1 assessment: 

















































































































































































































































































































































3145673 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
3146458 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 
3170489* 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
3205746 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
3232874 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
3245496 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
3277382 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 
3351236 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
3362233* 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
3372195 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
3379100 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
3416568 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
3421895 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
3439089 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 5 
3456731 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
3481721* 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
3493014 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
3644393 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
3654862 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
3679151 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
3704945 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 
3709416 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 
3721448 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 5 
3723468 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 4 
3766101* 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
3782157 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 4 
3795920 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
3877897 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
3913657* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
3921416 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
3933389 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
3949541 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
3960797* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
4015907* 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
4023152 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
4038101 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 4 
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4054537 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
4222885 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
4228449 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
4260959 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
4267048* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 
4269696 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
4273017 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 
4308216 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
4313311 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
4325704 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 
4366498 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
4368797 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
4381219 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 
4427722 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 
4445311 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
4452622 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 4 
4486849 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 
4544170 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 4 
4562655* 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
4590591 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
4631791 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
4646452 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 4 
4648308 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
4668495 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 
4709987 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
4731665 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 
4733433 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
4742290* 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 5 
4801133 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 
4815152 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 
4879500 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
4891737 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
4899684 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
4933257 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
4991451 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
5760341* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 4 
5775162 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
5782541 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 
5800732 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
5824759 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
5842397 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
5865626 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
5940972 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
6077682 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 5 
6106414* 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 
6137302 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
6198783 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
6199558 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 





Rater 2 assessment: 
 

















































































































































































































































































































































3145673 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
3146458 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
3170489* 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
3205746 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
3232874 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
3245496 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
3277382 0 0 0  1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 
3351236 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 
3362233* 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 
3372195 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
3379100 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
3416568 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
3421895 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
3439089 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 5 
3456731 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
3481721* 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
3493014 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
3644393 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
3654862 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 
3679151 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
3704945 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
3709416 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
3721448 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 
3723468 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 
3766101* 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 
3782157 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 
3795920 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
3877897 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
3913657* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
3921416 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
3933389 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 
3949541 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
3960797* 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
4015907* 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
4023152 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
4038101 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 3 
4054537 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
4222885 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
4228449 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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4260959 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
4267048* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
4269696 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
4273017 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
4308216 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
4313311 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
4325704 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
4366498 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
4368797 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
4381219 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 
4427722 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 
4445311 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
4452622 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 3 
4486849 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
4544170 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
4562655* 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
4590591 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
4631791 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
4646452 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 
4648308 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
4668495 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
4709987 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
4731665 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
4733433 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
4742290* 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 4 
4801133 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
4815152 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 
4879500 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
4891737 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
4899684 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
4933257 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
4991451 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
5760341* 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
5775162 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
5782541 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
5800732 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
5824759 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 
5842397 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
5865626 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
5940972 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
6077682 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0  1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 
6106414* 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 5 
6137302 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
6198783 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
6199558 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 





Rater 3 assessment: 
 

















































































































































































































































































































































3145673 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 
3146458 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 4 
3170489* 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
3205746 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
3232874 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
3245496 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
3277382 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 5 
3351236 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 5 
3362233* 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
3372195 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 
3379100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
3416568 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
3421895 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
3439089 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 5 
3456731 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 5 
3481721* 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 
3493014 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
3644393 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
3654862 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
3679151 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
3704945 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 
3709416 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 
3721448 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 
3723468 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 
3766101* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 
3782157 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 5 
3795920 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
3877897 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
3913657* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
3921416 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
3933389 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 
3949541 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
3960797* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
4015907* 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
4023152 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
4038101 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 3 
4054537 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
4222885 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
4228449 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 
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4260959 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
4267048* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 
4269696 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
4273017 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 
4308216 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
4313311 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
4325704 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
4366498 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
4368797 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
4381219 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 5 
4427722 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 
4445311 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 
4452622 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 
4486849 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 
4544170 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 4 
4562655* 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
4590591 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
4631791 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
4646452 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 4 
4648308 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
4668495 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
4709987 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
4731665 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 
4733433 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
4742290* 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 
4801133 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 5 
4815152 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 
4879500 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 
4891737 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
4899684 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
4933257 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
4991451 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
5760341* 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 
5775162 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
5782541 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 
5800732 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 
5824759 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 
5842397 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
5865626 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
5940972 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 
6077682 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 
6106414* 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 
6137302 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
6198783 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
6199558 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 





Rater 4 assessment: 
 

















































































































































































































































































































































3145673 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
3146458 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 
3170489* 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
3205746 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 
3232874 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 
3245496 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
3277382 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
3351236 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
3362233* 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 4 
3372195 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
3379100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
3416568 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
3421895 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
3439089 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 3 
3456731 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
3481721* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 
3493014 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
3644393 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
3654862 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
3679151 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
3704945 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
3709416 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
3721448 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0  1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
3723468 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 
3766101* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
3782157 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 3 
3795920 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
3877897 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
3913657* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
3921416 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 
3933389 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
3949541 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
3960797* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 
4015907* 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
4023152 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
4038101 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
4054537 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
4222885 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
4228449 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
123 
 
4260959 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
4267048* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
4269696 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 
4273017 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
4308216 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
4313311 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
4325704 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
4366498 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
4368797 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
4381219 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
4427722 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 
4445311 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
4452622 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 
4486849 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
4544170 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
4562655* 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
4590591 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
4631791 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
4646452 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
4648308 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
4668495 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
4709987 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
4731665 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 
4733433 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
4742290* 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
4801133 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
4815152 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 
4879500 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
4891737 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
4899684 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
4933257 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
4991451 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
5760341* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 
5775162 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
5782541 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
5800732 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 
5824759 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
5842397 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 
5865626 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
5940972 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
6077682 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
6106414* 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 
6137302 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 
6198783 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
6199558 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 



























































































































































































































































































































3145673 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3146458 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3170489* 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3205746 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
3232874 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3245496 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3277382 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3351236 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3362233* 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
3372195 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
3379100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3416568 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3421895 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3439089 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
3456731 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3481721* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3493014 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3644393 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3654862 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3679151 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3704945 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3709416 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
3721448 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3723468 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3766101* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
3782157 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
3795920 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3877897 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3913657* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3921416 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3933389 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
3949541 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3960797* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
4015907* 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4023152 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4038101 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
4054537 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4222885 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4228449 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
125 
 
4260959 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4267048* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
4269696 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4273017 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4308216 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4313311 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4325704 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4366498 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4368797 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4381219 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4427722 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
4445311 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4452622 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
4486849 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4544170 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4562655* 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4590591 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4631791 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4646452 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4648308 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4668495 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4709987 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4731665 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4733433 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
4742290* 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
4801133 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4815152 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
4879500 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4891737 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4899684 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4933257 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4991451 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5760341* 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
5775162 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5782541 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
5800732 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5824759 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5842397 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5865626 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5940972 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6077682 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
6106414* 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
6137302 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6198783 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6199558 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6243679 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 






SAMPLE SPSS OUTPUT 
SPSS output for accident # 4709987.  
rater_diff12 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid -1 1 4.5 4.5 4.5 
0 21 95.5 95.5 100.0 
Total 22 100.0 100.0  
 
rater_diff23 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid -1 1 4.5 4.5 4.5 
0 19 86.4 86.4 90.9 
1 2 9.1 9.1 100.0 
Total 22 100.0 100.0  
 
rater_diff34 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid -1 1 4.5 4.5 4.5 
0 20 90.9 90.9 95.5 
1 1 4.5 4.5 100.0 
Total 22 100.0 100.0  
 
rater_diff41 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid -1 1 4.5 4.5 4.5 
0 20 90.9 90.9 95.5 
1 1 4.5 4.5 100.0 






                          
                         rater_diff13 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid -1 1 4.5 4.5 4.5 
0 20 90.9 90.9 95.5 
1 1 4.5 4.5 100.0 
Total 22 100.0 100.0  
 
rater_diff24 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid -1 1 4.5 4.5 4.5 
0 19 86.4 86.4 90.9 
1 2 9.1 9.1 100.0 
Total 22 100.0 100.0  
 
 






present Factor present 
Rater1 Factor not present 20 1 21 
Factor present 0 1 1 





Standard Errora Approximate Tb 
Approximate 
Significance 
Measure of Agreement Kappa .645 .324 3.237 .001 
N of Valid Cases 22    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 











present Factor present 
Rater2 Factor not present 19 1 20 
Factor present 2 0 2 





Standard Errora Approximate Tb 
Approximate 
Significance 
Measure of Agreement Kappa -.065 .046 -.324 .746 
N of Valid Cases 22    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
 






present Factor present 
Rater3 Factor not present 20 1 21 
Factor present 1 0 1 





Standard Errora Approximate Tb 
Approximate 
Significance 
Measure of Agreement Kappa -.048 .034 -.223 .823 
N of Valid Cases 22    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 












present Factor present 
Rater4 Factor not present 20 1 21 
Factor present 1 0 1 





Standard Errora Approximate Tb 
Approximate 
Significance 
Measure of Agreement Kappa -.048 .034 -.223 .823 
N of Valid Cases 22    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
 






present Factor present 
Rater1 Factor not present 20 1 21 
Factor present 1 0 1 





Standard Errora Approximate Tb 
Approximate 
Significance 
Measure of Agreement Kappa -.048 .034 -.223 .823 
N of Valid Cases 22    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 











present Factor present 
Rater2 Factor not present 19 1 20 
Factor present 2 0 2 





Standard Errora Approximate Tb 
Approximate 
Significance 
Measure of Agreement Kappa -.065 .046 -.324 .746 
N of Valid Cases 22    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
 
kalpha judges = Rater1 Rater2 Rater3 Rater4/level = 1/detail = 0/boot = 
10000. 
 
Run MATRIX procedure: 
 
Krippendorff's Alpha Reliability Estimate 
 
 
             Alpha    LL95%CI    UL95%CI      Units   Observrs      Pairs 
Nominal      .0916     -.3976      .5108    22.0000     4.0000   132.0000 
 
Probability (q) of failure to achieve an alpha of at least alphamin: 
   alphamin          q 
      .9000     1.0000 
      .8000      .9999 
      .7000      .9975 
      .6700      .9975 
      .6000      .9913 
      .5000      .9521 
 
Number of bootstrap samples: 
  10000 
 
Judges used in these computations: 
 Rater1   Rater2   Rater3   Rater4 
 
Examine output for SPSS errors and do not interpret if any are found 
 





SPSS output for accident # 5940972.  
rater_diff12 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid -1 1 4.5 4.5 4.5 
0 20 90.9 90.9 95.5 
1 1 4.5 4.5 100.0 
Total 22 100.0 100.0  
 
rater_diff13 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid -1 3 13.6 13.6 13.6 
0 18 81.8 81.8 95.5 
1 1 4.5 4.5 100.0 
Total 22 100.0 100.0  
 
rater_diff23 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid -1 2 9.1 9.1 9.1 
0 20 90.9 90.9 100.0 
Total 22 100.0 100.0  
 
rater_diff24 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid -1 1 4.5 4.5 4.5 
0 20 90.9 90.9 95.5 
1 1 4.5 4.5 100.0 





                                    rater_diff34 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid -1 1 4.5 4.5 4.5 
0 18 81.8 81.8 86.4 
1 3 13.6 13.6 100.0 
Total 22 100.0 100.0  
 
rater_diff41 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid -1 1 4.5 4.5 4.5 
0 20 90.9 90.9 95.5 
1 1 4.5 4.5 100.0 
Total 22 100.0 100.0  
 






present Factor present 
Rater1 Factor not present 18 1 19 
Factor present 1 2 3 





Standard Errora Approximate Tb 
Approximate 
Significance 
Measure of Agreement Kappa .614 .249 2.880 .004 
N of Valid Cases 22    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 











present Factor present 
Rater1 Factor not present 16 3 19 
Factor present 1 2 3 





Standard Errora Approximate Tb 
Approximate 
Significance 
Measure of Agreement Kappa .397 .240 1.954 .051 
N of Valid Cases 22    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
 






present Factor present 
Rater2 Factor not present 17 2 19 
Factor present 0 3 3 





Standard Errora Approximate Tb 
Approximate 
Significance 
Measure of Agreement Kappa .699 .194 3.437 .001 
N of Valid Cases 22    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 











present Factor present 
Rater2 Factor not present 18 1 19 
Factor present 1 2 3 





Standard Errora Approximate Tb 
Approximate 
Significance 
Measure of Agreement Kappa .614 .249 2.880 .004 
N of Valid Cases 22    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
 






present Factor present 
Rater3 Factor not present 16 1 17 
Factor present 3 2 5 





Standard Errora Approximate Tb 
Approximate 
Significance 
Measure of Agreement Kappa .397 .240 1.954 .051 
N of Valid Cases 22    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 













present Factor present 
Rater4 Factor not present 18 1 19 
Factor present 1 2 3 





Standard Errora Approximate Tb 
Approximate 
Significance 
Measure of Agreement Kappa .614 .249 2.880 .004 
N of Valid Cases 22    
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
 




Run MATRIX procedure: 
 
Krippendorff's Alpha Reliability Estimate 
 
 
             Alpha      Units    Obsrvrs      Pairs 
Nominal      .5521    22.0000     4.0000   132.0000 
 
Judges used in these computations: 
 Rater1   Rater2   Rater3   Rater4 
 
Examine output for SPSS errors and do not interpret if any are found 
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